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WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers regularly discover unexpected correlations. For
example, here is an entry in the "Who knew . . . ?" annals of
medicine: gum disease is a risk factor that doctors can use to predict
cardiovascular disease.1 Perhaps even more unexpected than these
correlations themselves, however, is the patent protection that seems to
be available under the contemporary patent regime for the researchers
who discover them. Here is the corresponding entry in the "What if
• . . ?" annals of patent law: had the researchers who first discovered
the correlation between gum disease and cardiovascular disease been
patent savvy, they could have claimed a useful and nonobvious method
of assessing cardiovascular health. They could have sought rights to
exclude others from performing the following two acts in succession:
(1) examining a patient's gums and (2) correlating the presence (or
absence) of gum disease with an increased (or not-increased) risk of
cardiovascular disease.
These hypothetical patent rights are troubling because of a
confluence of distinct concerns about excessive legal and insufficient
willful control over thought. On the one hand, the cardiovascular-risk
claim propertizes thought. It sanctions a form of private, negative
thought control: it grants a patentee a legal right to exclude others from
a method in which the only contribution that the patentee makes to
progress is an act of mental cognition about information that the
patentee disclosed to the public in the patent specification.2 The
propertization of thought may take the property generated by the patent
regime too far; it may create a problem of excessive legal control over
human thought. On the other hand, the hypothetical claim is
particularly troubling even in relation to other thought-propertizing
claims because potential infringers cannot control their own potentially
infringing thoughts. The recited act of correlating is reflexive.3 When
people say that their minds "jump to logical conclusions," they do not
1. See, e.g., Robert Genco et al., Periodontal Disease and Cardiovascular
Disease: Epidemiology and Possible Mechanisms, 133 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N, June
2002, at 14S.
2. See Kevin Emerson Collins, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 329-35 (2007)
(defining a thought-propertizing claim). To follow standard patent law terminology, this
Article refers to mental processes as "acts" despite the fact that action is sometimes
defined in opposition to thought.
3. This Article refers to involuntary cognition as a reflexive "act." This
usage does not follow the usage of "act" in some legal discourse wherein the existence
of an act entails voluntariness. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT & RESPONSIBILITY 98
(1968) (quoting Austin's Lecture XVIII); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAw 54 (1946).
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understand the process to involve one part of the mind-the will-
instructing another part to jump. Combined with the fact that patent
infringement is a "strict liability" cause of action,' the reflexive nature
of a claimed act of thinking seems to put the law-abiding public that
wants to avoid patent infringement in a bind. Strict liability means that
a defendant's innocence and lack of intent to infringe are legally
irrelevant,5 and a defendant who performs the steps of a method claim
is therefore routinely held per se liable for patent infringement. 6 If strict
liability is narrowly construed in this fashion, the only way that a
dentist can avoid performing the method described above is to avoid
looking inside a patient's mouth. The dentist cannot help but perform
the reflexive correlating step if he or she reads about the link between
gum and heart disease and then sees the patient's gums. In sum, the
claim is potentially troubling not merely because it is a thought-
propertizing claim, but also because it is a reflexive-thought-
propertizing claim.
Although the dentist hypothetical may seem far-fetched, reflexive-
thought-propertizing claims that follow its basic template are routinely
allowed under the contemporary patent regime. The Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") issues "test and correlate" patent claims,'
and the Supreme Court was cued up last term to address the validity of
such a claim in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
4. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
5. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 645 n.5 (1999) ("'infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional
and without knowledge of the patent'") (quoting 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 16.02 (1998)); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 35 (1997) (neither the doctrine of equivalents nor literal infringement requires a
showing of intent to infringe); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550 (1872)
("innocent" infringement is still infringement). However, knowledge of a patent and
intent to infringe may affect the availability of damages, 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000)
(marking and notice requirements), the amount of damages available, id. § 284; Lam,
Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474 (10th Cir. 1982) (providing for treble
damages in some cases of willful infringement), and the existence of contributory
infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (requiring knowledge of the patent for contributory
infringement). Cf Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799 (2002) (arguing that patent
infringement works on a modified strict liability regime because notice and marking
affect the remedies available to a patentee upon a finding of infringement).
6. The experimental use doctrine is an exception to this general rule. See
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the
experimental use exception to strict liability for uses that are "solely for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry"). This Article uses the phrase
"liable for patent infringement" to refer to the status of being an infringer, not the
narrower status of being monetarily liable for damages.
7. See infra note 139 (discussing "test and correlate" claims).
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Laboratories., Inc. before the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.8 Like the gum-disease hypothetical, the claim at
issue in Laboratory Corp. was premised on the discovery of an
unexpected correlation in human blood: a high level of one chemical,
the amino acid homocysteine, corresponds to a deficiency of a second
chemical, vitamin B12.' Continuing the parallel, the Laboratory Corp.
claim recited a two-step method of diagnosing a vitamin B12
deficiency: (1) testing a patient's homocysteine level and (2) correlating
the presence (or absence) of an elevated level of homocysteine with the
presence (or absence) of a vitamin B12 deficiency. Prior to the
discovery of the correlation, some homocysteine tests were in the
public domain. After the discovery, however, all doctors who ordered
homocysteine tests performed the claimed method because knowledge
of the homocysteine-vitamin B12 correlation was widespread and no
doctor could avoid performing the inventive, reflexive act of correlating
after having viewed the results of a homocysteine test. If strict liability
is construed as per se liability for performing the claimed method, a
doctor must avoid ordering a homocysteine test in order to avoid
performing the claimed method.10
This Article isolates and analyzes the problem that an individual's
inability to control reflexive thoughts creates for the patent regime. It
does so by bracketing important questions about thought-propertizing
claims in general, including the normative question about whether they
should be held to recite patentable subject matter under section 101 of
the Patent Act." It narrows the focus in this fashion in part to drill
down and address one aspect of the Laboratory Corp. case in an
analytically precise manner. However, it takes this approach in part
also to branch out and demonstrate that the problem isolated by drilling
down is not specific to claims involving reflexive acts of thinking.
Strategically, this Article looks to a problem that surfaces most plainly
8. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
9. To minimize technical jargon, this description simplifies the correlation.
For a more precise description, see infra note 98.
10. Laboratory Corp. addressed the indirect liability of a company that sold
homocysteine tests, but this Article focuses on the direct liability of the doctors who
ordered the tests. See infra note 175 (noting that a defendant's indirect liability cannot
exist without a third party being directly liable).
11. This Article assumes for the sake of argument that thought-propertizing
claims recite patentable subject matter. For analysis of whether the patent regime
should permit the propertization of thought in general, see Collins, supra note 2, at Part
III.B-C (considering two doctrinal approaches to assessing the patentability of thought-
propertizing claims under section 101); Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought:
Efficiency, Autonomy and Personhood (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Wisconsin Law Reviet (exploring the normative problems attendant to the
propertization of deliberate thought).
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at or just beyond the periphery of the realm of traditionally patentable
subject matter in order to better understand the center of that realm.
Substantively, this Article proposes and defends a constructive-
nonvolition exemption from patent infringement. It argues that strict
liability in patent law should not mean absolute liability for using a
technology covered by a valid patent claim. It pries the factual issue of
appropriating the entitlement delineated by a patent claim (i.e., using a
claimed technology) apart from the legal issue of infringing the
patentee's rights. Constructive nonvolition allows a court to identify the
situations in which the defendant's choice set is unduly restricted and
his or her control over the use of a patented technology is therefore
insufficient to justify the imposition of liability. More specifically, it
focuses on the cost that the hypothetical defendant who wants to respect
patent rights must incur in order to avoid infringement or reduce the
benefit received from the patented technology. If in order to reduce that
benefit a defendant must abandon valued privileges that exist in either
the prior art or more broadly a possible world in which the patented
technology is never invented, then constructive nonvolition exists, and
the defendant should not be liable. For example, if in order to avoid
performing the method of cardiovascular risk assessment discussed
above, a dentist must avoid looking into patients' mouths and therefore
forego a career as a dentist, then the dentist's performance of the
claimed method is a constructively nonvolitional appropriation of the
patent entitlement that should not amount to patent infringement.
Similarly, a doctor who must avoid ordering homocysteine tests (for
valued purposes other than diagnosing a vitamin B12 deficiency) is a
constructively nonvolitional appropriator if he performs the claimed
method at issue in Laboratory Corp.' 2
To clarify what constructive nonvolition is, it is useful to
emphasize several things that constructive nonvolition is not. First,
constructive nonvolition does not involve a direct translation into patent
law of the exemption from liability for nonvolitional acts that exists in
the strict liability regimes of criminal law, trespass, and copyright.
Constructive nonvolition is to nonvolition as constructive notice is to
notice: it identifies the conditions under which the law should treat a
defendant as a nonvolitional actor regardless of whether the defendant
12. Although this Article uses strict liability as a framing device, constructive
nonvolition is an exemption from all liability from infringement, not merely from the
strictness of strict liability that catches innocent actors. Even if the doctor/dentist knows
of the existence of the patent, realizes that the conduct will lead to the performance of
the claimed method and intentionally engages in that conduct, the doctor/dentist may
still act in a constructively nonvolitional fashion.
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acted volitionally as a factual matter.13 Second, constructive nonvolition
does not presume an invalid or impermissibly overbroad patent claim.
Patent law's invalidity doctrines prohibit claims that literally encompass
more technology than an inventor has actually invented, and these
invalidity doctrines are conventionally presumed to be the only bulwark
that is required to avoid patent damages that overreward an inventor
and that unfairly or inefficiently tax the public. Constructive
nonvolition challenges the sufficiency of this bulwark. It does not raise
the problem of too many embodiments of a technology being included
within the descriptive figure of a patent claim. It raises the problem of
inadequate noninfringing options remaining for a defendant in the
undescribed ground outside of that figure. Third, constructive
nonvolition is a defense that is available only to a subset of alleged
infringers. It does not necessarily imply that a patentee looses his or her
in rem rights.14
To demonstrate that constructive nonvolition is a concept of
general applicability in patent law, Part II explains constructive
nonvolition without reference to reflexive-thought-propertizing claims.
It uses the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' recent opinions in
SmitIKline Beecham v. Apotex'5 and the Canadian Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Monsanto v. Schmeise?6 to illustrate and explain a
constructive-nonvolition exemption to direct infringement.
The remainder of this Article then brings the newly minted concept
to bear on reflexive-thought-propertizing claims. Part III initially
defines a thought-propertizing claim. After illustrating the reflexive
nature of some acts of thinking, it then argues that reflexive-thought-
propertizing claims raise the same problem of constructive nonvolition
that exists in all of patent law and that they do so in spades. It also
differentiates between claims to freestanding, reflexive acts of thinking,
13. It is dubious whether the nonvolition exemption in other areas of the law
is ever a straight-up issue of fact rather than a legal conclusion designed to achieve
policy goals. See, e.g., infra notes 82, 86. More generally, the scope of liability in a
strict liability regime is often analyzed as a matter of policy. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi
& Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055,
1060 (1972) (discussing the role of the cheapest cost avoider in defining the limits of
strict liability in tort).
14. If it is likely that a significant percentage of the potential alleged infringers
of a particular claim will be constructively nonvolitional appropriators, then it might be
reasonable to invalidate the claim up front and avoid the fact-intensive and costly
procedure of sorting the infringers from the constructively nonvolitional appropriators.
The question pertaining to claim invalidity, however, is a second-order question that
can be addressed only after the defense of constructive nonvolition is established. See
infra text accompanying note 208.
15. See infra note 52.
16. [2004] S.C.R. 902.
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where the constructive-nonvolition problem is self-evident, and claims
to irrevocable bundles like the claim at issue in Laboratory Corp.,
where the constructive-nonvolition problem may often be more difficult
to recognize.
Part IV focuses on claims to irrevocable bundles in general and on
the Laboratory Corp. claim in particular. With respect to claims to
irrevocable bundles, it demonstrates that courts may afford patentees
protection that is both economically and constitutionally overbroad
when they equate strict liability with absolute liability and that
recognition of a constructive-nonvolition exemption trims off the
overbreadth. Bringing this analysis to bear on the lower court
proceedings in Laboratory Corp., it draws two lessons. First, it argues
that the lower courts granted Metabolite overbroad protection because
they failed to identify all of the constructively nonvolitional
appropriators. Second, it brings into sharp focus the intricacy of the
factual analysis that may frequently be required to sort defendants who
are infringers of reflexive-thought-propertizing claims from those who
are constructively nonvolitional appropriators.
II. STRICT LIABILITY AND CONSTRUCTIVE NONVOLITION
This Part argues that courts should recognize a constructive-
nonvolition exemption from liability for patent infringement. The first
Section identifies two consensus principles that animate most normative
justifications of patent law. The second Section argues that strict
liability for patent infringement can violate both of these principles if
courts equate strict liability with absolute liability but not if courts
recognize a constructive-nonvolition exemption from patent
infringement.
A. Two Minimalist, Consensus Principles of Patent Policy
Two basic principles form a backstop for the justifiable extent of
patent protection. The reward principle holds that the inventor's reward
must be only a fraction of the welfare benefit attributable to the
technology that the inventor actually invented. The baseline principle is
a negative corollary of the reward principle: the public should not be
made worse off by the development of a technology and its patenting
than it would have been had the invention never been invented at all.
These two principles identify a normative least common
denominator. Crafted in response to both efficiency- and fairness-
oriented justifications of patent law, they describe characteristics shared
765
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by most visions of what patent protection should be (provided, of
course, that patent protection should exist at all).17 They are necessary
but not sufficient attributes of a justifiable patent regime. They
strategically sacrifice detail and bite to achieve a minimalist
consensus. 
18
1. THE REWARD PRINCIPLE
The reward principle limits the size of the reward that the patentee
can reap: the patentee's reward may derive only from the marginal
increase in social welfare that is attributable to the existence in the
world of technology that the patentee actually invented. Patents hold out
the possibility of a financial reward as a carrot to lure potential
inventors into inventive pursuits, 9 but the objective of patent law is not
simply to compensate all those who engage in inventive activity. The
17. This Article does not consider ex post efficiency justifications of patent
law. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977) (elaborating a prospect theory of patent law); Mark A.
Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129 (2004) (differentiating ex ante from ex post justifications). If an ex post
prospect-theory justification is taken seriously, there are situations in which patent
protection should violate the baseline and reward principles. For example, assume that
chemical A exists in the prior art without a significant known use; that an inventor
patents a single new use for chemical A; and that the principal importance of the patent
is as a signal that there are many further, inventive uses for chemical A that have yet to
be discovered. Prospect theory suggests that the inventor can make a reasonable
argument that society is better off if the inventor has an exclusive right to the prior-art
chemical A.
18. A more restrictive, controversial position is not required to illustrate the
error of equating strict liability with absolute liability
19. The incentive-to-invent justification of patent law presumes that, absent a
patent regime, self-interested actors inefficiently underinvest in the generation of
inventive information. Inventive information is a public good: it is nonrival (the
marginal cost of providing it to another consumer is zero, or at least close thereto) and
nonexclusive (others cannot be excluded from consuming it). ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONoMIcs 673 (4th ed. 1998). The potential inventor
knows that potential competitors will learn about any inventive information generated
from goods that embody it. (If the goods produced are noninforming in that they do not
teach the public the inventive information, then patent apologists must rely on an
incentive-to-disclose justification.) Absent a patent regime, the potential inventor
expects competitors to drive goods embodying the inventive information down to their
marginal cost of production. Anticipating this inability to recoup the sunk costs of
invention, the potential inventor chooses not to invest in becoming an actual inventor.
With patent protection, inventive information remains a nonrival good but it becomes a
partially exclusive good. Potential inventors expect to internalize some of the value that
the public derives from their inventive information, so their self-interest may be
furthered by becoming actual inventors and investing labor and capital in the generation
of inventive information.
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patent regime is a meritocracy: only successful inventors receive a
reward. Furthermore, it is the market that measures the existence and
extent of success: rewards are measured by reductions in marginal costs
of production and increases in consumers' willingness to pay. 20 The
costs that even successful inventors (at least successful in the sense that
they receive patents and exercise some monopoly power) sink into
inventive activities may not be fully recouped if the invention's supply-
side efficiencies are too small or consumers' willingness to pay for the
invention is insufficiently strong.2' To allow the market to measure
success, it is critical that a market for technology that the patentee did
not actually invent never drives a patentee's reward.1
2
Both efficiency- and fairness-oriented worldviews provide
normative justifications of the reward principle as a limit beyond which
a patentee's profit should not extend. The efficiency ramifications of
the reward principle are twofold. First, the reward principle helps in a
rough fashion to limit patent protection to what is needed to provide an
efficient incentive to invent. Too much patent protection has the same
potential to be harmful that too little does. 3 Second, the reward
principle permits patent rights to provide feedback to inventors about
consumer desires.2 4 If a patentee's reward is not proportional to
consumers' willingness to pay, then inventors and investors do not
receive the proper signals, and their self-interest does not lead them to
20. An incentive system need not measure success by willingness to pay. A
prize system could measure success based on the quantum of technological advance as
assessed by experts. Cf Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 115, 127-70 (2003) (discussing four prize systems). The government could also
reward technological contributions based on utility gains not reflected by willingness to
pay. For example, it could reward vaccines for diseases prevalent only in
underdeveloped countries.
21. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 300 (2003) (noting the lack of any
relationship between costs of and reward for invention under the patent regime).
22. The reward principle only stakes out an outer limit: the patentee's reward
should never derive from technology that the inventor did not actually invent. It does
not entitle the patentee to the full social value of the inventive information generated.
See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (emphasizing the role of welfare
spillovers from invention in patent law).
23. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 21-24 (discussing the basic cost-
benefit tradeoffs of intellectual property); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058-65 (2005) (addressing the
problems that arise from overcompensating inventors).
24. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 178-79 (Steven R. Munzer ed.,
2001) (discussing a utilitarian theory of intellectual property based on optimizing
patterns of productivity).
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the areas of research that produce the greatest welfare benefits (as
measured by a willingness to pay, of course).25
The reward principle also furthers a basic fairness concern. John
Locke famously postulated that a person can generate a moral claim to
property in the state of nature by mixing his labor with the raw
materials of the commons.26 Simply described, if John clears a field in
the plenteous woods and cultivates a crop of wheat, both the land and
the wheat become John's property because John has property in his
body that, through labor, extends to the valuable goods that he
produces. This story of the body has been recast as a story of the mind
to produce a labor theory of patents: John has property in his mental
faculties, so he has property in the inventive ideas that he reaps from
the vaguely Platonic and inexhaustibly productive "field of ideas" after
he has labored with his mental faculties to cultivate that "field. ,
2 7
Scholars have repeatedly challenged the normative strength of a
labor-theory justification that is sufficiently robust to support either
contemporary patent law or any doctrinal variant of patent law at all,28
and the purpose of this brief discussion is not to defend a labor-theory
justification of patent rights. The purpose is more humbly to reinforce
the importance of the reward principle as a limit on patent protection.
Assuming that a labor theory of property has some normative force
when applied to patent law, it clearly cannot sanction a patent regime
that grants an inventor control over technology that the inventor in no
way can be said to have invented.
25. Inventors do not need to internalize all of the benefit created by their
inventions. The argument here is only an intrapatent argument. To foster the efficient
distribution of research funds (and assuming a uniform need for incentives), inventors'
proportionate shares of the social value of inventive information should be roughly
equal in all technological fields.
26. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 130 (J.M. Dent &
Sons 1924). See also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 137-252
(1988) (presenting Locke's theory of property).
27. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
315 (1988). For an overview of the wide variety of conclusions that scholars reach
based on a Lockean justification of intellectual property, see Fisher, supra note 24, at
184-89.
28. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?
The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817
(1990); Seanna Valentine Schiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138,
159-66 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (questioning a Lockean justification of
intellectual property under any of three different characterizations of the initial
commons).
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2. THE BASELINE PRINCIPLE
The baseline principle establishes a set of privileges that a
justifiable patent regime cannot take away from the public (including an
inventor's competitors): the public's privileges should not be made
smaller by a patent than they would have been if the patented invention
had never been discovered. The baseline principle is part of the flip
side of the reward principle.2 9 Where the reward principle limits the
rights of a patentee, the baseline principle reserves a minimum set of
privileges for the public.
Because the relevant baseline requires counterfactual reasoning-
what would the world be like if the patented invention had never been
discovered?-the rhetoric of "possible worlds" offers a concise way to
discuss the baseline principle.3 The baseline invokes a possible world
that is as close as possible to the actual world in all respects, except that
the inventive technology does not exist." This Article refers to the
29. The baseline principle is only part of the flip side of the reward principle.
It does not prohibit the patentee from obtaining a right to exclude from all after-arising
improvements on the patented technology whose presence in the world is impossible
without the inventive information discovered by the patentee. In contrast, the reward
principle should limit a patentee's reach into such after-arising improvements. The line
between the after-arising improvements that an inventor did and did not actually invent
is a difficult line to draw, but it is not relevant to this Article's use of the reward
principle.
30. See DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 20-27 (1986)
(exploring the rhetorical use of possible worlds in counterfactual thinking). The
existence and nature of possible worlds is a subject of considerable debate in
philosophical and linguistic circles. This Article only adopts the rhetoric of possible
worlds as a way to talk about counterfactual reasoning; its arguments do not take a side
in the philosophical debate.
31. The "actual world" is a term of art in possible-world discourse. In a
"realist" understanding of possible worlds, the actual world is merely one of the many
possible worlds and is just one that "is special, closer to our hearts and distinguished
somehow from the others that are 'merely' possible." JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS
5 (2002) (structuring possible-world discourse around a debate between realist and
antirealist camps). "Close," too, is a possible-world term of art. See LEWIS, supra note
30, at 21. As soon as one creates a possible world by making a single change to the
actual world, one opens a Pandora's Box of other possible changes. See, e.g., id.
(noting that in a possible world defined by the premise that "kangaroos ha[ve] no tails"
it is possible to assume as well that "kangaroos float around like balloons"). Even if
"gratuitous departure[s] from the background of fact" in the actual world are
prohibited, the possible-world construct defined by a single, counterfactual shift from
the actual world is better understood as "an ill-defined class" of possible worlds rather
than a single possible world. See, e.g., id. (noting that in a possible world in which
"kangaroos have no tails" there is "no telling whether the kangaroos have stumps
where the tails should be"). The notion of the possible world that is closest to the actual
world follows from the choice of the single possible world from the ill-defined set that
is the most reasonable from the perspective of the actual world. See id. In sum, the
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baseline possible world as Possible World 1 ("PWI") and the contents
of PW1 as "PW1 technologies." The baseline principle holds that the
public's privileges in the actual world with a patented technology
cannot be diminished with respect to the privileges that the public
possesses in PW1. In other words, patents cannot restrict access to
PW1 technologies.
PW1 contains two groups of technology. PW1 contains the
technologies that are prior art with respect to the patented invention-
those technologies that were in existence before the discovery of the
patentable invention.32 Because patent law relies on the prior art in its
day-to-day operation, the identification of the prior art is unlikely to
create many administrative problems for the generation of PW1.
However, PW1 contains more than prior-art technology.33 Because it is
defined on a particular historical date, the prior art is static. In contrast,
the contents of PW1 grow during the term of a patent. Although PW1
lacks the patented invention and its improvements, technological
progress in PWl does not come grinding to a halt. PW1 still contains
all technologies that are unrelated to the patented technology and
discovered despite the absence of the patented technology. Much more
so than the definition of the prior art, the definition of this category of
post-invention-yet-unrelated technologies is open to a host of
controversies at the margin.34 Thankfully, however, these controversies
notion of the closest possible world in which a technology does not exist tethers the
possible world under consideration to the actual world in every way that does not seem
dependent on the existence of the patented technology. Cf infra note 34 (discussing the
line-drawing problems inherent in identifying the contents of a possible world).
32. The prior art consists of technologies that were actually in existence prior
to the date of the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (g) (2000) (novelty), and
technologies that were only constructively in existence, id. § 103 (nonobviousness). For
the sake of simplicity, this Article equates the prior art with the technology that existed
prior to the discovery of a patentable invention and disregards the prior art created by
the statutory bars. See id. § 102(b), (d) (describing statutory bars that generate prior art
with respect to dates of filing rather than dates of invention).
33. Many constructive-nonvolition cases can be resolved by assuming that
only the prior art is in PW1, but some cases require that PW1 incorporate postinvention
technology. See, e.g., infra notes 64, 157 (discussing how PW1 art that is not the prior
art is important in constructive-nonvolition analysis).
34. The question required to define this category with precision is a
counterfactual of immense complexity: over the term of a patent, how does the set of
technologies extant in PWl diverge from the set extant in the actual world? For
example, if the discovery of technology A highlighted the consumer demand for
competing technologies B and C, but did not provide any technological advance
required to produce them, are B and C present in the PW1 defined by the absence of
A? Cf infra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in Laboratory
Corp. of determining whether the vascular-heath correlation exists in PWI defined by
the absence of the vitamin B12 correlation).
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do not need to be addressed in most cases. What is important is that
PW1 contains both the prior art and at least a set of intuitively
identifiable postinvention technologies that are clearly unrelated to the
subject matter of the patent. For example, if someone invents a glass-
sided toaster so consumers can tell how brown their toast is before it
pops out of the toaster, both prior-art toasters and other postinvention
technologies clearly unrelated to the glass-sided toaster, such as wrist-
TVs, software, and isolated and purified genes, are PW1 technologies.
Not surprisingly, the normative justifications of the baseline
principle mirror those discussed in reference to the reward principle.35
If a patentee controls PW1 technology, the public inefficiently
underutilizes it from a short-run, static-efficiency perspective (if they
get to use it at all), yet the existence of a long-run, dynamic-efficiency
gain is highly questionable. 36 From a fairness perspective, a patent
should not take something away from the public that an inventor cannot
make a colorable claim to have produced through labor. Patent rights
that violate the baseline principle are a form of unfair compulsion or
bullying of the public.37
3. THE PRINCIPLES' LIMITATIONS
The reward and baseline principles are modest propositions. They
have limited bite. They are satisfied by a broad array of patent regimes.
Because it is critical to understand what these principles are not in order
to understand what they are, this subsection highlights three limitations
that mitigate the practical impact of these principles.
First, the reward principle does not prevent inefficient
overprotection of inventive information. It is entirely possible that all
patent regimes are inefficient, so restrictions on the nature of patent
35. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27 (outlining the normative
justifications of the reward principle).
36. A patent system that does not respect the baseline principle raises antitrust
concerns. The baseline-principle presumption that a patent does not harm buyers in
markets for goods available prior to the discovery of the patented invention plays a
large role in defusing the potential conflict between a patentee's exclusive rights and
antitrust law. 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
1780a (2d ed. 2004). But see id. at 454 n.7 (noting that a patentable improvement
invention may affect the price of PWI technologies in the actual world because it may
reduce demand for a prior art good to a point that is below a minimum efficient scale of
production).
37. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and
Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 478 (1992) (discussing "fair compulsion"
in intellectual property).
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protection categorically cannot- guarantee efficiency.38 Furthermore, it
is widely believed that an inventor should not be able to internalize the
entire welfare benefit attributable to the invention's presence in the
world.39 The patent regime has positive externalities and spillovers vis-
A-vis the inventor built into its very core. 4 Efficient rewards should be
a proportionate fraction of, not equal to, the welfare benefit attributable
to the technology actually invented by the inventor. 4 The reward
principle merely marks an outer extremity of patent protection that
should under no circumstances be surpassed.42
38. The public is worse off in the actual world with a patented technology
priced above its marginal cost of production than it is in a possible world with the same
technology without patent protection. The extent to which this fact forms the basis of a
convincing indictment of the patent regime, however, depends on the extent to which
the technological contents of the actual world would still exist if patent protection were
eliminated.
39. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution
(Revised Version: May 16, 2007), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/
shapiro/align.pdf (defining the "appropriability ratio" of optimal patent protection as
the ideal "ratio of the patent holder's payoff to the social contribution associated with
the patented invention").
40. Lemley, supra note 23, at 1046-69 (defending the efficiency-enhancing
role of free riding in intellectual property law). The spillovers take several forms. In
part, they can be traced to the disclosure requirements. LANDES & POSNER, supra note
21, at 298-99 (discussing the "incomplete appropriability" in patent law that results
from the disclosure requirements). In part, they derive from blocking patents on
improvements. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1000-13 (1996) (discussing how blocking patents
reduce the benefit of an invention that a patentee can internalize). Even the limited
duration of patent rights can be viewed as a spillover-producing provision. See 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). A property-maximalist regime without spillovers is almost
unimaginable. Cf R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual
Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003) (illustrating
that even a self-styled maximalist perspective of intellectual property presumes that
patented inventions have positive externalities).
41. Rewards that are smaller than the full quantum of the welfare benefit
produced by the existence of an invention in the world can also be justified on fairness
grounds. See Gordon, supra note 37, at 478-79 (noting that rights of recovery should
be limited to what is necessary to recoup the value added).
42. The fact that patents should not violate the reward principle does not mean
that inventors are never overrewarded under the contemporary patent regime. Owners
of patents on components of a larger product may be overrewarded because of the
bargaining power that they achieve through holdup and systematic error in the
calculation of reasonable royalties. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007). Mistakenly issued patents
that read on the prior art violate the reward principle (as well as the baseline principle).
See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 29-33 (arguing that an enhanced patent reexamination
procedure would bring patent rewards into closer alignment with inventors'
contributions).
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Second, the baseline principle disregards the cost of administering
the patent regime. Some patents erroneously encompass obvious
inventions, granting patentees claims that literally read on what should
be PW1 technologies in a perfectly administered patent regime. Even if
these error costs are assumed away and only inventive technologies are
patented, the practioners of PW1 technology incur search costs in the
actual world that do not incur in PW1. Because the boundaries of patent
rights are often fuzzy,43 some practioners of PW1 technology endure
the costs of litigation in the actual world. Furthermore, because patent
searches are not only fuzzy, but also costly, some defendants who think
they are practicing PW1 technology infringe patents. These innocent
infringers use a technology that, to their surprise, is patented. They are
willing to pay the competitive price for the technology, but they wind
up paying damages as well and thus more than they were willing to
pay." The cost of search and the uncertainty of fuzzy boundaries make
some practioners of PW1 technology worse off in the actual world than
they are in PW1.
Third, neither the reward nor the baseline principle restricts how
patent protection deals with independent or nearly simultaneous
invention. Under contemporary patent doctrine, independent inventors
are infringers, and independent invention of a patented technology is
not a valid defense to infringement. 45 The absence of an independent-
invention defense does not violate either the reward or the baseline
principles because PW1 is defined here not only as a possible world in
which the inventor fails to discover the patented technology but also as
a possible world in which nobody discovers the patented technology.
Although it is reasonable to argue that patent doctrine should give
special dispensation to independent inventors on both efficiency and
fairness grounds,46 such dispensation is not required to satisfy the
43. Cf Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005) (discussing the
growing reversal rate of claim construction rulings by the Federal Circuit).
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (linking monetary remedies to a reasonable
royalty or the patentee's lost profits).
45. Cf supra note 5 (discussing innocent infringement).
46. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 37, at 450 n.2 (noting that the fairness
argument supporting intellectual property is undermined in patent law because
independent invention is not a defense to infringement); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA
535 (2002) (arguing that an independent-invention defense maintains sufficient
incentives to invent while reducing dead-weight loss); Shapiro, supra note 39, at 19-29;
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
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minimalist, consensus position staked out by the reward and baseline
principles.
B. Constructive Nonvolition
Defendants in patent infringement suits commonly argue in
substance that they should prevail because the patentee's rights do not
satisfy the reward and/or baseline principles. Yet, defendants do not
use these terms. They couch their arguments in a variety of specific
doctrines, most all of which point to the same conclusion: the scope of
a claim is too broad because it allows a patentee to control PW1
technology.47 The argument may sound in claim construction: the
meaning of a claim's terms should be interpreted so that the claim
describes only the technology that the inventor has "actually invented"
and nothing more.48 It may sound in novelty or nonobviousness: a claim
cannot encompass prior art technologies that the inventor did not
invent, either literally49 or through the doctrine of equivalents. ° It may
sound in enablement or written description: a valid claim cannot
describe technologies unrelated to those disclosed in the patent.
51
In most instances, these scope-limiting tools are the only tools that
courts need to enforce the reward and baseline principles. Cases
involving defendants who qualify for the constructive-nonvolition
exemption, however, are the exception to this rule. Constructive
nonvolition does not involve claims that are overbroad on their face. It
involves an unjustifiable restraint on the public's ability to avoid the use
or benefit of a claimed technology. A defendant uses a patented
technology in a constructively nonvolitional manner whenever the
defendant must give up a valued privilege to use an unpatented PW1
47. The control may result from a literal claim that is too expansive, see
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917)
(describing the literal scope of a claim as the "metes and bounds" of an inventor's
property interest), or from an overly liberal application of the doctrine of equivalents
that expands a patentee's rights beyond literal claim scope, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-28 (1997) (reaffirming the vitality of the
doctrine of equivalents).
48. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
49. See supra note 32 (discussing novelty and nonobviousness).
50. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
684-85 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing the "hypothetical claim" limitation on the scope of
the doctrine of equivalents).
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (setting out the disclosure doctrines).
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technology in order to avoid or reduce the benefit obtained from the
patented technology.
Both defendants who use a patented technology through a
deliberate act and those who do so through an involuntary act can avail
themselves of a constructive-nonvolition defense. Although the
definition of constructive nonvolition is the same in both types of cases,
each is introduced independently.
1. DELIBERATE-ACT CASES
The concept of constructive nonvolition in a deliberate-act case is
best introduced through an example, and the unusual facts pleaded by
the plaintiff in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp. provide an
excellent one.51 In the 1970s, SmithKline Beecham ("SmithKline")
invented and patented a specific form of crystalline paroxetine
hydrochloride ("PHC"), which for simplicity can be labeled Form One.
In the mid- to late-1980s, SmithKline invented and patented a new and
more stable form of PHC-Form Two. SmithKline received FDA
approval to market PHC as an antidepressant drug under the name
Paxil". When Apotex applied to the Food and Drug Administration to
market a generic version of Form One PHC after the expiration of the
Form One patent but before the expiration of the Form Two patent,
SmithKline sued.
SmithKline argued that Apotex's generic pill infringed its Form
Two patent because any attempt to manufacture Form One would
necessarily produce trace amounts of Form Two. This factual allegation
placed SmithKline Beecham in an awkward but not impossible position.
SmithKline had to insist that Apotex's Form One pill would necessarily
be contaminated with Form Two to demonstrate use of a substance
within the scope of the Form Two claim, but it also had to contend that
pure and uncontaminated Form One was all that was produced prior to
the invention of Form Two to ensure the validity of its Form Two
claim. To thread this needle, SmithKline offered expert testimony on
"polymorph" and "seeding" theories. Form Two is a polymorph of
PHC that is difficult to produce initially but, once produced, is
infectious. Crystals of Form Two that come into contact with Form
One induce the less stable Form One to transform spontaneously into
Form Two. SmithKline alleged that "the general environment" and
52. 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.) (SmittXline 1), aff'd,
365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (SmithKline II), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc) (SmithKline II), remanded to 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(SmithKline IV,). The plaintiffs allegations recited in the following text are presented in
SmithKline II, 365 F.3d at 1308-10.
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Apotex's factories in particular had become "seeded with crystals" of
Form Two, making "the creation of a pure version of the old [Form
One] . . . difficult, if not impossible."53
The courts had a difficult time addressing SmithKline's alleged
facts. They repeatedly attempted to render them legally irrelevant,54 and
a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in its second
opinion eventually concluded that the seeding and polymorph theories
were unsupported as a matter of fact by the record.5 The concept of
constructive nonvolition, however, directly and succinctly addresses
SmithKline's allegations.
Constructive nonvolition puts a spotlight on the fact that
SmithKline's invention of Form Two not only increases Apotex's
options but also restricts them. In one sense, the invention of Form
Two in the actual world gives Apotex an option that does not exist in
PWl: if Apotex values the extra stability of Form Two vis-A-vis Form
One, Apotex can seek a license from SmithKline to produce Form
Two. However, the invention of Form Two also takes away some
options that Apotex possessed in the actual world prior to the invention
of Form Two and that Apotex continues to possess in PW1. To
eliminate Form Two from its generic PHC drug, Apotex has two
options. It can abandon the production of Form One until after the
expiration of the Form Two patent, or, as the district court noted, it can
build a new plant in Antarctica, far from the threat of seeding.56
Critically, both of these options place Apotex in a worse position than
Apotex occupies in PW1 where nobody invented Form Two. Apotex
must retreat from its PW1 privileges in order to avoid making Form
53. Smithline I, 365 F.3d at 1310. A patent law adage states that if an
object that comes into existence after an invention has been made infringes a claim,
then the object would have anticipated the claim (i.e., rendered the claim invalid for
lack of novelty) if it had existed earlier, before the time at which the invention was
made. See Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 228 (1893). SmithKline's pleadings
respected the rule of law conveyed by this statement but undermined it as a matter of
fact, alleging that the nature of a Form One pill was changed by the bringing of the
Form Two invention into the world.
54. The district court read a variety of limitations on concentration into the
Form Two claim to conclude that Apotex did not infringe despite the trace amounts of
Form Two in its generic drug. SmithKline I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-30. An initial
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overruled this claim
construction but held the claim invalid because of a public use under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). SmithKline 11, 365 F.3d at 1316-21. Acting en banc, the Federal Circuit
vacated this opinion. SmithKline 111, 403 F.3d at 1329.
55. SmithKline IV, 403 F.3d at 1342-46 (concluding that Form Two had
always been produced "as a natural derivative of practicing" the method described in
SmithKline's Form One patent).
56. SmithKline 1, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21.
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Two or reduce the benefit that it receives from Form Two. 57 The
invention of Form Two, together with its dispersal, changes the physics
of the world in a manner that reduces the set of privileges that a
noninfringing Apotex can enjoy in the actual world in comparison to
the set of privileges that Apotex can enjoy in PW1.58 It decreases
Apotex's options, rather than leaving them unaffected, if Apotex
chooses not to license or practice the technology claimed by
SmithKline's patent. In PW1, Apotex can manufacture Form One of
PHC anywhere in the United States after the expiration of the Form
One patent. In the actual world, Apotex cannot manufacture Form One
outside of Antarctica.
Apotex should not be an infringer. Apotex's deliberate choice to
hit the "on" button in the factory while knowing that some Form Two
will exist in its pills is an example of constructive nonvolition.
Although contested during the case, the novelty and nonobviousness of
the Form Two claim are not the crux of the problem if SmithKline's
allegations are taken seriously. Rather, the problem is the restricted
nature of Apotex's options for avoiding the use of the claimed
technology. If Apotex seeks to respect patent entitlements and desires
not to manufacture Form Two, its choice set is impermissibly
restricted.
A decision to avoid SmithKline's patented technology and not to
manufacture Form Two imposes a cost on Apotex that cannot be
justified under the reward and baseline principles.59 A claim-avoiding
57. In his concurrences in SmithKline II and SmithKline IV, Judge Gajarsa
focuses on the difficulty of avoiding infringement. He argues that the Form Two claim
is per se invalid under section 101 because it fails to give the public sufficient notice of
how to avoid infringement if a "natural physical process" transforms Form One into
Form Two. See SmithKline IV, 403 F.3d at 1359 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); SmithKline
11, 365 F.3d at 1329 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). But see infra text accompanying notes
68-71 (arguing that SmithKline is not a section 101 case).
58. The reduction follows from an amalgam of nonlegal and legal constraints.
The constraint is nonlegal in the sense that the "architecture" of the world changed. See
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 664-65 (1998)
(contrasting law and architecture as distinct modalities of regulation). Whereas
performing steps A, B, and C in PWl produces Form One, performing steps A, B, and
C in the actual world produces Form One with trace amounts of Form Two. Legal
constraints contribute to the problem because it is patent law that takes the performance
of steps A, B, and C in the actual world off the slate of options available to a
noninfringer if strict liability is equated with absolute liability.
59. More precisely, the cost should be measured not by the cost of avoiding
the claimed subject matter altogether but rather by the cost of further reducing the
benefit obtained from the appropriation. See infra text accompanying notes 65-68. This
added precision is not required to understand SmithKline because Apotex can reduce
the benefit obtained from Form Two only by avoiding appropriation of the Form Two
entitlement.
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Apotex is legitimately expected to bear a cost as part and parcel of a
well-functioning patent regime-the opportunity cost of practicing the
PW1 art in the actual world rather than the patented technology. If
Apotex does not reach a licensing agreement with SmithKline, it must
be expected to bear the opportunity cost of making a Form One PHC
pill when SmithKline can make Form Two. However, the cost to
Apotex of not manufacturing Form Two impermissibly includes the
cost of abandoning a privilege enjoyed and valued in PW1, namely the
ability to manufacture Form One (or at least to do so elsewhere than in
Antarctica). To avoid manufacturing Form Two, Apotex must retreat
from its PW1 privileges in violation of the baseline principle. Because
SmithKline can prevent Apotex from enjoying PW1 privileges in the
actual world if strict liability is strictly construed, SmithKline's reward
also violates the reward principle. If Apotex were an infringer, the
licensing fee that SmithKline could obtain from Apotex reflects not only
the benefit of Form Two vis-a-vis Form One (the opportunity cost of
practicing the PW1 art) but also the benefit of being able to produce
Form One in the United States rather than in Antarctica.
New terminology is required to articulate a constructive-
nonvolition argument. The conceptual stranglehold that a per se rule of
strict liability holds on patent law surfaces in the paucity of patent
rhetoric: infringement is the only term in the standard lexicon to
describe a defendant's performance of the steps of a valid method claim
or the use of a technology that satisfies all of the limitations of a valid
product claim. The existence of liability, however, is built into the
concept of infringement. There is no concise language for describing
conduct that satisfies the limitations of the patent claim but that does not
imply that the defendant is liable. This Article therefore coins the
phrase "appropriation of the patent entitlement" to drive a conceptual
wedge between the use of a claimed technology and the legal
determination of infringement. Apotex appropriated the patent
entitlement insofar as it manufactured trace amounts of Form Two and
SmithKline's claim was broad enough to encompass a pill that
contained these trace amounts. Because Apotex is a constructively
nonvolitional appropriator, however, Apotex should not be held liable
for patent infringement.
A second illustration of constructive nonvolition in a deliberate act
case was explored as a hypothetical in Monsanto Canada Inc. v.
Schmeiser, a patent infringement case recently decided by the Supreme
Court of Canada. 60 Schmeiser is a farmer who grows canola; Monsanto
owns a patent that reads on canola seeds that are genetically modified
60. [2004] S.C.R. 902. The facts recited below are summarized in 59-68.
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("GM") to be resistant to Monsanto's Roundup herbicide. Schmeiser
alleged that in 1997 he first discovered that Monsanto's herbicide-
resistant crops were planted on his farmland when a significant
percentage of the canola in one of his fields survived after the
application of Roundup. He surmised that the wind blew the seeds onto
his land from a nearby farm or a passing truck. At the end of 1997, he
harvested, segregated, and saved the seeds from the canola in the field
that survived the application of Roundup and used them to plant new
fields in 1998.
Monsanto sued Schmeiser for patent infringement. Even accepting
Schmeiser's factual allegations, the Court held him liable for patent
infringement. The Court emphasized that its infringement holding did
not pertain to the "innocent discovery by farmers of 'blow-by' patented
plants on their land or in their cultivated fields."61 The Court was
unable to explain exactly why cultivation of "blow-by" plants did not
constitute an infringing use when Schmeiser was strictly liable,62 but
constructive nonvolition provides the answer. If GM seeds are merely
blown onto a farmer's land, the farmer can avoid appropriating the
GM-seed entitlement altogether only by plowing under his fields,
letting the crop rot, or presciently building a precautionary fence
impermeable to wind-born seeds around his farm at an earlier point in
time. Requiring a "blow-by" farmer to take such measures to avoid
appropriating the GM-seed entitlement, however, forces the farmer to
abandon privileges that he enjoys in PW1 and thereby violates the
baseline and reward principles.63 In PW1, the farmer can grow non-GM
61. Id. 2; see also id. 86, 92.
62. The Court implies that the "blow-by" farmer might not use the seeds but
might merely possess them instead. Id. 86 (suggesting that the "blow-by" canola
farmer might be able to rebut the presumption of use that flows from possession). As in
United States law, Canadian patent law holds that mere possession of a patented
invention does not make a defendant liable and requires that a defendant use a claimed
invention to trigger infringement. Id. 28-58 (discussing Canadian law on use). The
position that the "blow-by" canola farmer does not use the claimed invention whereas
Schmeiser does, however, is questionable as a factual matter. Both farmers allow crops
to grow, and both farmers harvest them. One way of reading the Court's opinion is that
it contorts the use doctrine to achieve the policy goal of effectuating part of a
constructive-nonvolition exemption to patent infringement.
63. But ef id. 86 (suggesting that even the farmer who finds "blow-by"
canola seed on his land might have an obligation to "act[] quickly to arrange for its
removal"). The possibility that Monsanto might be able to force the "blow-by" farmer
not to cultivate or harvest the GM seeds if it compensates the farmer for any loss
incurred highlights a tension in constructive nonvolition between its efficiency- and
fairness-oriented justifications. If efficiency is the guiding principle, then Monsanto
should have the right to force the farmer not to cultivate and harvest so long as the
farmer is made financially better off in the actual world than he is in PWL. However, if
fairness is the dominant concern, then the farmer should have the right to continue the
779
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
crops and can do so without an impermeable fence. In the actual world,
the noninfringing farmer is legitimately required to bear the opportunity
cost of harvesting less-efficient, non-GM canola if he chooses not to
license Monsanto's patented GM canola. However, the noninfringing
farmer should not be forced to bear any cost above and beyond this
opportunity cost. If strict liability is equated with absolute liability for
the appropriation of Monsanto's patent entitlement, however, the
licensing fee that Monsanto can extract from the "blow-by" farmer is
much larger than the value of the technology that Monsanto actually
invented. 64
The actual facts in Schmeiser demonstrate that a further refinement
of the concept of constructive nonvolition is needed. Both the Apotex
and the "blow-by" farmer cases portray constructive nonvolition as a
legal determination that hinges on the cost to the defendant of avoiding
appropriation of the patent entitlement. The relevant question, however,
should be the cost to the defendant of reducing the benefit received
from appropriation. The Court found Schmeiser liable for patent
infringement, yet Schmeiser and the "blow-by" farmer cannot be
differentiated on the basis of the cost of avoiding appropriation of
Monstanto's patent entitlement. Schmeiser incurs the same costs as the
"blow-by" farmer if he chooses not to use the GM-seed technology at
all. He too must under plow his field. The difference between
Schmeiser and the "blow-by" farmer is that Schmeiser goes out of his
way to increase the benefit that he receives from the GM seeds that
blow onto his land:
[Mr. Schmeiser] in this case actively cultivated canola
containing the patented invention as part of [his] business
operations. Mr. Schmeiser complained that the original plants
came onto his land without his intervention. However, he did
not at all explain why he sprayed Roundup to isolate the
Roundup Ready plants he found on his land; why he then
harvested the plants and segregated the seeds, saved them,
and kept them for seed; why he next planted them; and why,
through this husbandry, he ended up with 1030 acres of
farming practices that he is able to perform in PW1, and he should not be forced to stop
farming merely because Monsanto offers compensation.
64. Schmeiser illustrates why it is important to define nonvolition with respect
to the opportunity cost of practicing the PW1 art rather than the opportunity cost of
practicing the prior art. It makes no difference whether the canola that Schmeiser grows
is prior art with respect to Monsanto's GM-seed invention. What matters is that
Schmeiser's canola farming is a privilege that Monsanto cannot possibly take credit for
based on its invention of the GM seed.
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Roundup Ready Canola which would otherwise have cost him
$15,000.65
Schmeiser, unlike the "blow-by" farmer, can reduce the benefit
that he receives from appropriating the GM-seed entitlement without
retreating from the PW1 baseline.66 He can avoid planting fields of
Monsanto's GM canola in 1998 without incurring a cost other than the
legitimate opportunity cost of practicing the PW1 art. Holding
Schmeiser liable for patent infringement violates neither the baseline
nor the reward principle. In contrast, the "blow-by" farmer cannot
reduce the "benefit" received from use of the patented technology
without engaging in a forced retreat from his PW1 life.
67
A hypothetical variation on the facts of SmithKline also illustrates
the relevance to constructive nonvolition of the defendant's ability to
reduce the benefit obtained from appropriation of a patent entitlement.
Xetopa, a different defendant in Apotex, manufactures PHC using a
process that produces a more stable pill of almost pure Form Two that
may have a longer shelf life. Xetopa cannot avoid appropriating the
Form Two entitlement without abandoning a PW1 privilege, yet
holding Xetopa liable as an infringer violates neither the baseline nor
the reward principles. Xetopa can alter its conduct and act like Apotex
without abandoning a PW1 privilege. In other words, Xetopa can
reduce the benefit that it obtains from appropriating SmithKline's Form
Two entitlement, so it is not a constructively nonvolitional
appropriator.68
Schmeiser and the Xetopa hypothetical illustrate that constructive
nonvolition merely relieves individual defendants of liability and that it
does not result in the more drastic end of invalidating a claim in its
entirety. The constructive-nonvolition inquiry in deliberate-act cases
65. Id. 87; see also id. 92.
66. If Schmeiser applies Roundup to his field in PW1 in 1997, the canola dies.
67. From a patent law perspective, "blow-by" farmers are receiving a benefit,
namely the use of the patented technology. Many "blow-by" farmers who sell organic
or non-GM crops, however, see the arrival of GM seeds on their land as a cost. See
Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in
Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547 (2004) (surveying Canadian civil law remedies for
farmers whose crops are contaminated by GM seeds).
68. Third-party conduct raises an interesting problem for constructive
nonvolition. In a variation on SmithKline, assume that seeding is not easily
accomplished and that it requires the release of Form Two in a special aerosol form
within the production facility where Form One is made. If Apotex itself releases the
aerosolized Form Two, Apotex is an infringer when it tries to produce Form One.
However, what is Apotex's status if a third party not in collusion with Apotex releases
the aerosolized Form Two? Should it matter if the third party is negligent? These
questions may become important in cases involving the spread of GM-seed technology.
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acknowledges that "natural phenomena," such as shifting chemical
structures and self-germinating seeds, throw a wrench in the routine
workings of patent doctrine.69 The traditional way for a defendant to
deal with a problem caused by "natural phenomena" is to invoke
section 101 of the Patent Act and argue that the claim at issue is invalid
because it recites unpatentable subject matter.7°  Constructive
nonvolition takes a defendant-specific approach. Thanks to "natural
phenomena," a patented GM seed that has blown onto a field containing
a similar crop germinates and grows. This event forces only the farmer
who harvests the field to take active steps to avoid appropriating the
entitlement. 7 The existence of "natural phenomena" bound up with the
patented technology is not a sufficient condition to render constructively
nonvolitional all acts that appropriate the patent entitlement. Schmeiser
purifies the "blow-by" crop after it blows into his field; other farmers
intentionally plant the patented GM seed without authorization. Xetopa
goes out of its way to make a patented chemical because the chemical
has a longer shelf life than the prior-art chemicals. In these last
examples, "natural phenomena" do not place the defendants in an
impermissible bind. The defendants are infringers because they can
reduce the benefit that they receive from the patented technology
without abandoning options that they possess and value in PW1.
2. INVOLUNTARY-ACT CASES
Compared to the deliberate-act cases, the involuntary-act cases are
the low-hanging fruit of an argument that constructive nonvolition
should provide an exemption from patent liability. As an exceptional
69. Cf Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 371, 400-03 (2005) (discussing SmithKline and Schmeiser as cases that involve
"inherent infringement").
70. Section 101 invalidates any claim that encompasses "natural phenomena"
because "natural phenomena" are unpatentable subject matter. See Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). Interestingly, a concurrence in SmithKline, see supra note
57, and a dissent in Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902, 107-11 (Arbour, J., dissenting
in part), both relied on arguments related to unpatentable subject matter to conclude that
the defendants were not liable.
71. In contrast, a patented widget that is not self-animated by "natural
phenomena" is merely possessed at best, not used, when it falls off of a truck into a
farmer's field. The constructive nonvolition implicated in the "blow-by" variant on
Schmeiser is not specific to self-replicating GM-seed technology. If a patented, long-
lasting fertilizer blows onto a farmer's fields, the "natural process" through which the
fertilizer nourishes plants means that the farmer is "using" the patentee's fertilizer
entitlement for many years. The self-replicating nature of the GM-seed technology
changes the stakes for the patentee, but it is not essential to the legal determination of
constructive nonvolition.
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rather than routine occurrence, any patent claim can give rise to an
involuntary-act case.72 All people lose control of their actions and
chattels from time to time. For example, a patentee claims a method of
stretching the human body that recites tumbling steps, and an alleged
infringer trips and reflexively performs the claimed method to avoid
injury. A patentee claims a method of fermentation that recites the act
of raising the temperature of a compound according to a particular
formula over time, and an alleged infringer has a sample of the
compound that is heated up in this manner because of an intermittent
power outage in the freezer. A patentee claims an improved stapler. An
alleged infringer passes out, falls on an unauthorized embodiment of the
stapler and staples a document. Because object claims are infringed
when the defendant makes, uses, or sells a claimed embodiment of the
object,73 they too can give rise to involuntary-act cases.
As in the deliberate-act cases, holding a defendant in an
involuntary-act case per se liable for appropriating a patent entitlement
can violate both the reward and baseline principles. The problem in
these cases is again the excessive cost that the defendants must incur in
order to avoid or reduce the benefit obtained from the patented
technologies. Even rational defendants cannot choose not to perform the
involuntary act itself,74 so an injunction targeted specifically on the
performance of the involuntary act is a contradiction in terms.75
72. But cf infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (arguing that
defendants' involuntarily acts may appropriate the entitlements described by reflexive-
thought-propertizing claims on a routine basis).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
74. The fact that people do not engage in a conscious cost-benefit analysis
prior to every choice that they make does not mean that their choices are not rational.
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 4. Nonetheless, an assumption that a choice
could be made is foundational to the rational maximization of ends, and no possible
choice-point exists immediately prior to an involuntary act.
75. A state-enforced right to exclude is not a straight-jacket rule. Cf Lessig,
supra note 58, at 664-65 (contrasting law and architecture as distinct modalities of
regulation). The sine qua non of legal protection of an entitlement with property rule is
that the state defends a private individual's right to exclude with its authority and
power. The hope, however, is that the state will not be called upon to overtly act in
most instances, that the background threat of ex post, state-imposed sanctions will deter
the rational personal-welfare maximizer ex ante from appropriating the entitlement
without the owner's consent, and that market exchanges of entitlements will flourish. A
right to exclude from others' involuntary conduct, however, does not promote market
exchanges because involuntary conduct cannot be deterred. Depending on one's
temperament, a right to exclude from others' involuntary conduct is either laughable or
Kafkaesque. Either the entitlement will simply go unprotected or appropriators will
eventually be sent to jail for contempt of court when they routinely violate an injunction
against appropriation. Of course, it is possible (although likely unreasonable) to enjoin
a defendant from creating the conditions that are required for the involuntary act to
occur. See infra text accompanying note 76.
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Appropriation of the patent entitlement, however, is rarely entirely
beyond the control of the defendant even in an involuntary-act case. It
is often possible for a defendant to avoid creating the conditions under
which the involuntary act of appropriation can occur. The fainter can
stay out of the bubble of space surrounding the patented stapler. The
freezer owner can chose not to own or freeze the compound. Here,
however, the cure is worse than the disease. Requiring potential
defendants to avoid the conditions necessary for involuntary
entitlement-appropriating acts to occur makes the patentee's claims
magnetic in a way that pulls all sorts of unclaimed conduct into the
patentee's sphere of control. A fainter who cannot approach within four
feet of a stapler is far worse off than he or she is in PW1, and the price
that the fainter will pay to be able to approach within four feet of a
stapler is way out of proportion to the benefit of the technology actually
produced by the patentee."
The involuntary-act cases raise questions about per se liability in
patent law in part because of their strong resemblance to conventional,
nonvolitional-act cases in criminal law, trespass, and copyright. In
criminal law, a nonvolitional act is a subcategory of the conduct that
fails to satisfy the "voluntary act" requirement and is therefore
unpunishable even under a strict liability law. 7 Roughly speaking, the
76. The difficult question that the involuntary-act, constructive-nonvolition
cases raise is not whether the reward and baseline principles are violated. They clearly
are. The difficult question is whether certain involuntary actors should be exempted
from liability when no innocent actors are exempted. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-44 (noting the innocent infringers may be worse off than they are in PW1
when the costs of administering patent rights are considered). It is reasonable, however,
to exempt the former but not the latter for two reasons. First, neither more clarity in
patent scope nor more thorough patent searches can resolve the problem created by
constructive nonvolition. Second, the litigation costs generated by a constructive-
nonvolition exemption for some involuntary actors are not as systemic as those that an
exemption for innocent infringers would create. A large percentage of defendants in
patent cases can raise a colorable invalidity argument and can therefore lay claim to
being innocent infringers. Few defendants, however, can allege a nonfrivolous and
involuntary entitlement-appropriating act.
77. The voluntary act requirement is sometimes presented as a unifying
principle on which all criminal liability depends, including strict liability crimes for
which there is no mens rea requirement. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1)
(1962) ("A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is
physically capable."); MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 17-18 (1993). Whether the voluntary
act requirement is a useful concept, however, is open to debate. Can the voluntary act
requirement provide a philosophical metanarrative that helps to legitimate criminal law
as a field? Cf JEAN-FRANCCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (identifying the
postmodern with a skeptical posture toward legitimating metanarratives). Or, is the act
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voluntary act requirement prohibits punishment based solely on status,
mental state, involuntary bodily movement, and omission.7" For the
philosophically inclined, the act requirement distinguishes voluntary
bodily movements that are punishable from involuntary ones that are
not based on the presence of an antecedent mental "volition" or wish to
perform the act.79 Volitional acts are the muscular contractions that a
person wills, authors, or ushers into being,8 ° whereas nonvolitional
bodily motions originate from some source other than an "individual
self' and elude the individual's control. 8' Nonvolitional bodily actions
include motions compelled by another (coercion), triggered by pain or
physical contact (reflex), or ordered by a person's unconscious mind
(automatism)." A disease, not an individual-as-subject, causes an
epileptic seizure.83
Trespass, too, illustrates the role of nonvolition as an exemption
from liability even in a strict liability regime .84 Although innocent
invasions are trespasses, nonvolitional invasions are not. If the
requirement an obfuscating appellation for a loosely affiliated set of normative rules
that address diverse problems? Compare MOORE, supra, at 6-7 (arguing that the
voluntary act is a meaningful category), with Symposium, Act and Crime, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 1443 (1994) (critiquing Moore's position).
78. MOORE, supra note 77, at 6-7. A combination of retributivist and
utilitarian reasoning supports the decision not to punish defendants for nonvolitional
acts. Individuals should not be held morally responsible for conduct that they did not
author in any meaningful way, Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal
Law: Justifying Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV.
443, 467 (1988), and legal sanctions cannot readily deter conduct that is beyond an
individual's control, 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.13.2(c), at
425-26 (2d ed. 2003).
79. HART, supra note 3, at 97-99 (1968) (summarizing Austin's conception of
volition).
80. Id
81. See Saunders, supra note 78, at 467.
82. HART, supra note 3, at 95-96. A nonvolitional act, narrowly framed, does
not always let a criminal defendant off the hook. If a driver who knows that he or she is
prone to epileptic seizures chooses to drive, has a seizure, and kills a pedestrian, the
driver's earlier volitional act of getting behind the wheel can become the willed act that
gives rise to criminal liability. See id. at 110-12; People v. Decina, 138, N.E. 2d 799,
804 (N.Y. 1956). The ambiguity in the breadth of the time frame used to identify a
nonvolitional act illustrates that the volitional-act requirement in criminal law is a
policy-based rather than a purely factual or analytical inquiry. See Mark Kelman,
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591
(1981) (demonstrating the importance of various frames that courts use to define
criminal defendants' acts).
83. HART, supra note 3, at 98 (quoting Austin's Lecture XVIII).
84. Technically, trespass to land is an intentional tort, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (defining trespass to land), but the required intent
exists whenever there is will or volition to move the body towards a desired result. Id.
§ 8A (defining intent).
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immediate muscular movement that propels a human body or some
other object across a boundary line has been willed by a person's acting
self, the invasion is voluntary regardless of a lack of knowledge of the
boundary's location. However, if a "friend" throws John across the line
or he has an epileptic seizure that propels him across the line, he is not
strictly liable for trespass regardless of the amount of actual damage
inflicted. 85 Even copyright doctrine has come to recognize an exemption
from liability in an otherwise strict liability regime when the defendant
produces a copy without a volitional act.86
The appropriation of a patent entitlement through an involuntary
act, however, is not sufficient evidence to let the appropriator off the
infringement hook. The following tale of two appropriators illustrates
that the involuntariness of the immediate act of appropriation should not
be a condition sufficient to allow the appropriator to evade liability. Joe
performs the recited method because he has a sudden and unexpected
panic attack at a point in time when he by coincidence just happens to
be in the vicinity of a patented stapler. Joe faints, lands on the stapler,
and appropriates the stapler entitlement. Jane desires a fancy staple in
the report she just finished. She stands over a patented stapler, uncorks
a bottle of ether, inhales, faints, falls onto the stapler, and staples the
document. Joe is a constructively nonvolitional appropriator. In order
to avoid appropriating the entitlement, Joe must incur far more than the
legitimate opportunity cost of practicing the PW1 art in the actual
world. In contrast, Jane can avoid appropriating the stapler entitlement
without abandoning valued PW1 privileges. Jane can choose not to pre-
85. See id. § 2 cmt. a ("There cannot be an act without volition."); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 73-75 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that "all acts in the sense of movements of the body directed by the will
are intentional" in the sense required for an actionable entry to land).
86. Copyright is a strict liability regime because a defendant who copies a
copyrighted work is an infringer even if the defendant does not know the work is either
copyrighted or an infringement of a copyrighted work, Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d
464, 470-72 (2d Cir. 1995), and even if the defendant does not consciously know that
he or she is copying anything at all, Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music,
Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). To restrict the liability of internet
service providers for the copies of third-party content that their servers automatically
make and display, the courts crafted a nonvolitional-conduct exemption from copyright
liability. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The nonvolitional
conduct exemption now encompasses situations in which the owner of an internet server
actively approves the posting of specific third-party content (i.e., an employee
volitionally hits an "approve" button). See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet Inc., 373
F.3d 544, 549-52 (4th Cir. 2004). The exemption no longer tracks nonvolitional
conduct as a factual matter (if it ever did); its scope is determined by the normative
goal of shielding a class of actors from liability for direct copyright infringement.
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position herself over the patented stapler and inhale the ether. 7 Jane's
act of infringement in a narrow time frame is equally as involuntary as
Joe's. She cannot help but fall after she loses consciousness.
Nonetheless, in terms of patent liability, Jane should be treated no
differently than someone who deliberately presses down on the stapler.
3. UNIFYING THE DELIBERATE- AND INVOLUNTARY-ACT CASES
In both the deliberate- and involuntary-act case types, a
constructive-nonvolition exemption to strict liability is required to
ensure respect for the reward and baseline principles. If the defendant
cannot avoid or reduce the benefit obtained from the patented
technology in the actual world without having to abandon valued PW1
technologies, then the defendant's appropriation of the claimed
entitlement should not render the defendant liable for patent
infringement.
The claim construction and the invalidity doctrines that are most
commonly used to prevent violations of the reward and baseline
principles cannot detect the violation at issue in a constructive-
nonvolition case. As Figure 1 illustrates, the literal scope of the claim
involved in a constructive-nonvolition case is not overbroad in any way
that a court using these doctrines is able to detect:
87. Jane, too, performs a set of actions that are part of the PW1 art. She
locates herself in space and inhales ether. If she performs these actions because she
values the stapling that results in the actual world and not the acts that lead up to the
stapling, then Jane is an infringer. Forcing Jane to avoid appropriating the entitlement
does not force her to abandon valued privileges in PWL. However, if Jane can make a
good-faith argument that she values inducing unconsciousness in this manner at random
locations in PW1, then she is a constructively nonvolitional appropriator. She is forced
to abandon a valued PW1 privilege in order to avoid appropriation. As this example
suggests, constructive nonvolition in involuntary-act cases can frequently be reduced to
a question of specific intent: did the defendant specifically intend to perform the
involuntary act? Cf infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the role that
the motivation for a defendant's willingness to pay plays in distinguishing infringers
from constructively nonvolitional appropriators in cases involving reflexive-thought-
propertizing claims).
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scope of claim
traditional overbreadth constructive nonvolition
(validity doctrines): (exemption from strict liability):
the claim describes PWI the claim does not describe PN1
technology either literally or technology, but a defendant must
through the doctrine of equivalents abandon the use of PW1 technology to
avoid using the claimed technology (or
reduce the benefit obtained)
FIGURE 1
In the traditional overbreadth scenario (on the left of Figure 1),
there is an unjustified presence within the figure of the claim. In
contrast, the crux of constructive nonvolition lies in an unjustified
absence from the public privileges that comprise the ground
surrounding that figure (on the right of Figure 1), an absence that is
traceable to an involuntary action or a self-perpetuating "phenomenon
of nature." Both an oversized figure and an undersized ground produce
the same result: a violation of the reward and baseline principles.
The goal of a constructive-nonvolition exemption from liability for
patent infringement is to identify defendants that the law should treat as
physiologically nonvolitional actors. The goal is not to identify those
actors whose narrowly framed acts of appropriation are nonvolitional
and thus entirely beyond their control as a factual matter. It is in this
sense that the proposed doctrine is constructive nonvolition and not
factual nonvolition.
The involuntariness of the immediate act of appropriation in the
involuntary-act cases serves more or less the same role in those cases
that the inevitableness of the "phenomenon of nature" serves in the
deliberate-act cases. Both raise red flags indicating that the defendant's
nonappropriating or benefit-reducing choices may be constrained.88
However, as Figure 2 illustrates, neither an involuntary immediate act
of appropriation nor the presence of a self-perpetuating "natural
phenomenon" is sufficient to prove constructive nonvolition:
88. The red flag arguably flies higher in an involuntary-act case. Therefore,
perhaps an involuntary, entitlement-appropriating act should produce a presumption
that, if unrebutted, a constructive-nonvolition exemption from liability is merited and a
deliberate-act case should involve the opposite presumption.
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constructively nonvolitional appropriation:
excessive cost of appropriation-avoidance or
benefit-reduction
Xetopa Apatex




(: 7selff perpetuatingq--------- ------ ..... involu ntary
and option-limiting entitlement-appropriating act
"phenomena of nature"
FIGURE 2
In both case types, the definition of constructive nonvolition is
identical: constructive nonvolition arises when a defendant, who
structures his or her activities so as to minimize any invasion into the
patentee's inventive terrain, cannot enjoy in the actual world the
privileges that he or she values in PW1. 8 Constructive nonvolition
exists when a defendant's choice set is impermissibly constrained: the
defendant must either give up a valued right to practice a PW1
technology or appropriate the entitlement described by the patentee's
claim. Inversely, constructive nonvolition allows a defendant to practice
a patented technology when the choice not to practice the patented
89. The common law doctrines of easement by implication and easement by
necessity in real property law provide an interesting, if imperfect, parallel to
constructive nonvolition in patent law. Both doctrines allow landowner A to obtain an
easement to use the land of neighboring landowner B when a common owner previously
held the parcels of A and B, and A's use of B's land is necessary to A's enjoyment of
A's own land. An easement by implication arises when A's use was apparent at the
time of severance. An easement by necessity can arise even if A did not use B's land at
the time of severance. See Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 60 (1986). In a constructive-nonvolition defense, the defendant (or
the public more broadly) stands in the shoes of A claiming a right to practice a PW1
technology, and the patentee plays the role of B. B cannot deny A access to PWl
technologies when B files for a patent and carves off a bit of inventive terrain as private
property from what had (potentially) been available for all. If it is necessary for A to
use B's property in order to enjoy A's own rights to practice a PWl technology, then A
should have an easement to use B's property.
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technology imposes a cost greater than the legitimate opportunity cost
of practicing the PW1 art and the choice not to appropriate the patent
entitlement necessarily entails a choice to abandon the use of a valued
PW1 technology.
III. PATENTING REFLEXIVE ACTS OF THINKING
This Part describes the propertization of reflexive thought. The
first Section defines the propertization of thought' and introduces
Claim 13 of United States Patent 4,940,6589' ("the '658 patent"), the
claim at issue in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, InC.,92 as an example of a thought-propertizing claim.
The second Section distinguishes purposive and reflexive acts of
thinking. The third Section argues that the need for a constructive
nonvolition exemption will be especially acute when a patentee alleges
infringement of a reflexive-thought-propertizing claim because
defendants' involuntary acts will routinely appropriate the patent
entitlement. The final Section distinguishes two types of reflexive-
thought-propertizing claims-claims to freestanding, reflexive acts of
thinking and claims to irrevocable bundles-and suggests that each type
merits a distinct analysis.
A. Propertizing Thought
Patent law enforces two distinct and opposed entitlements. It grants
a patentee a right to exclude from an invention's claimed embodiments.
The public cannot perform the "attaching" and "welding" actions of a
claimed method of making a widget without the patentee's
authorization.93 Simultaneously, however, patent law mandates the
creation of a commons or a public domain. Patent law's disclosure
requirements grant the public a legal privilege to think about the idea
that animates the patented attaching-welding invention and communicate
the idea to others. The quid pro quo of patent law requires an inventor
to disclose information about the invention to the public, information
that the inventor could have attempted to guard behind a veil of
90. This Section summarizes arguments presented at greater length in Collins,
supra note 2, at Part I.
91. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10, 1990).
92. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (specifying the patentee's exclusive
rights).
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secrecy.94 Once disclosed, this inventive information passes beyond the
control of the inventor. It becomes freely available to the public so long
as if remains in the form of information qua information.95
Historically, these two opposing entitlements coexisted peacefully,
side by side, at the heart of patent law because each governed a
different resource. The intuitive line that divides goods that exist in the
spatial world of extension from information goods that reside primarily
in the realm of information and ideas marked the boundary between the
realms in which each applied. People readily differentiate the
propertizable, real-world actions implicated in the process of making
widgets from the unpropertizable information qua information about
widget making, so the dividing line between the regimes persisted,
largely unquestioned and never precisely delineated. The mental steps
doctrine and the printed matter doctrine are the closest the PTO and the
courts have come to drawing a line to identify the information qua
information that had to remain in the public domain.96
A patentee who seeks to claim, and thus propertize, the mere act
of thinking about information offered to the public in the patent's
disclosure threatens this informal detente between the public's right to
use inventive information and the patentee's right to exclude from the
claimed embodiments. For example, consider the claim at issue in
Laboratory Corp., a case in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and then dismissed as improvidently granted after oral argument.
97
Three academic researchers discovered, among other things, a
statistical generalization about the chemical contents of human blood.
94. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)). The
disclosure provisions of section 112 codify the inventor's disclosure obligations. See 35
U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000). The disclosure provisions are not a natural or inevitable
consequence of patent law. Inventive information is "exacted' from the patentee by
design. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003).
95. Cf 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2007) ("[O]n
[publication] the patent immediately increases the storehouse of public information
available for further research and innovation .... ").
96. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 95, § 1.03[6]; Collins, supra note 2, at Part
III.C. 1. The scope of the mental steps doctrine was notoriously ill defined, and it was
never adequately justified. Cf In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("It
is self-evident that thought is not patentable."). The core of the mental steps doctrine
was recently revived by the Federal Circuit in In re Comiskey. No. 2006-1286, 2007
WL 2728361, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) (invalidating a broad claim reciting a
business method that can be performed without a machine under the mental steps
doctrine). Whether the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court will extend Comiskey to
invalidate all claims that propertize thought is unclear.
97. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted). For a more complete presentation of the Laboratory Corp. proceedings, see
infra Part IV.D. 1.
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More specifically, they discovered the "vitamin B12 correlation": a
level of one chemical (the amino acid homocysteine) corresponds to a
deficiency of a second chemical (vitamin B12).98 The researchers
received two types of claims in the '658 patent to protect their work.
Claim 1 described a new method of "assaying," or testing, the
concentration of homocysteine in a patient's blood.99 This claim was
relatively uncontroversial and was never asserted in Laboratory Corp.
In contrast, Claim 13 recited a two-step method of using a
homocysteine test to diagnose the existence, or nonexistence, of a
vitamin B12 deficiency: (1) "assaying" a patient's homocysteine level;
and (2) "correlating" a low or high level of homocysteine with the
presence or absence, respectively, of a vitamin B12 deficiency."
Under the standard rules of patent infringement, a doctor infringes
Claim 13 whenever he or she performs or causes to be performed both
of these steps. 0'
Claim 13 propertizes thought: it recites a human act of thinking
that is necessary to make the claimed method useful, novel, or
nonobvious.' ° Three facts are required to explain why Claim 13
propertizes thought. First, the researchers did not invent the
homocysteine test. Technologies for testing homocysteine were known
prior to the researchers' work, °3 and elevated homocysteine levels
were already useful for a variety of purposes, including diagnosing a
rare genetic disorder' °4 and assessing a patient's risk of having a heart
98. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354,
1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Technically, the researchers discovered a correlation
between "total homocysteine"-a measurement of homocysteine in four different
complexed forms-and either of two specific B vitamins: cobalamin (vitamin B12) and
folate. Because this Article does not question the novelty or nonobviousness of the
correlation, the precise nature of the correlation is not important. It opts for ease of
communication over scientific precision and simply refers to a correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin B12.
99. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, col.41 11.1-19 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued
July 10, 1990).
100. Id. col.41 11.58-65. This Article refers to the process of diagnosing the
existence vel non of a vitamin B12 deficiency as simply the diagnosis of a vitamin B12
deficiency.
101. See Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v. Integrated Liner Techs., 216 F.3d 1367,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding direct infringement of a method claim if and only if
"each of the claimed steps of a patented process [is] performed").
102. See Collins, supra note 2, at Part I.C (defining the propertization of
thought).
103. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, col.6 11.6-8.
104. Brief for Appellees at 43 & n. 12, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120). This Article refers to
the knowledge used to perform this diagnosis as the "genetic-disease correlation."
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attack or developing a vascular disease. 115 Second, the testing step
recited in the claim encompasses any technique of testing for
homocysteine, regardless of whether a person uses a technique that was
known prior to the researchers' work, developed by the researchers
themselves, or discovered only after the researchers filed their patent
application." 6 Together, these first two facts demonstrate that the data-
gathering "assaying" step is neither novel nor patentable on its own and
that the inventiveness of Claim 13 resides entirely in the second
"correlating" step. Third, the "correlating" step describes a human act
of thinking. It recites an applied act of human reasoning that a doctor
can employ to verify the truthfulness of a conclusion about an
individual patient's vitamin B12 deficiency."0 7 After receiving the
homocysteine test, a doctor presumptively has two pieces of
knowledge. The doctor knows from the test that an individual does or
does not have an elevated homocysteine level. The doctor also knows
the statistical generalization discovered by the researchers, given that it
was published in the patent0 8 and the general medical literature. Once
in possession of these two pieces of information, the doctor can
perform the act of "correlating": the doctor can verify the truthfulness
of the conclusion that the patient does (or does not) have a vitamin B12
deficiency.
105. Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607); Corrected Brief for Appellant at 13,
31-32, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120); Brief for Appellees at 12, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120). However,
widespread clinical acceptance of the practice of using elevated homocysteine levels as
a predictor of vascular disease did not develop until the 1990s, after the issuance of the
'658 patent. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2923 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Corrected Brief
for Appellant at 13-14, 31-32, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings,
370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120). This Article refers to the knowledge
used to perform this diagnosis as the "vascular-disease correlation." For other alleged
uses for homocysteine tests, see Corrected Brief for Appellant at 32-33, Metabolite
Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
1120).
106. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the
parties agree on this construction of "assaying"). The defendant in Laboratory Corp.
used a method of testing for homocysteine that was wholly different from and invented
after the method recited in Claim 1 of the '658 patent. Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at
1359.
107. See Collins, supra note 2, at Part I.D.2 (describing the logical structure of
the "correlating" step of Claim 13).
108. Because a person who does not know about the correlation will not
perform the claimed method, patent searches that uncover reflexive-thought-
propertizing claims do not allow defendants to avoid infringement. They perversely
cause infringement.
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B. Purposive and Reflexive Acts of Thinking
The acts of thinking that can fall within the scope of a patent claim
span a spectrum from purposive to reflexive. This Section explores that
spectrum.
People perform some mental tasks only after having deliberately
decided to undertake them. If presented with six numbers between 101
and 999 and instructed to multiply them, many people can perform the
assigned task in their minds if they are given sufficient time.
Importantly, however, most can choose to quit without having reached
an answer. 09 The mental task is therefore a purposive act of reasoning.
The acting self sets the self's mental faculties to the task. For most
people, the occurrence of the act of reasoning is not beyond willful
control.
Many of the historical mental-steps cases involved claims to
purposive acts of thinking. The claims at issue recited complex
mathematical operations and had value primarily insofar as they read on
computer software, but they were sometimes broad enough to read on
human thought as well."' The Supreme Court's first attempt at
resolving the patentability of computer software involved precisely such
a claim. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court addressed the patentability
of a "method for converting binary coded decimal number
representations into binary number representations.""' One of the
Benson claims was arguably broad enough to encompass mental
performance of the method," 2 but the lengthy series of discrete acts
recited in the claim could in all likelihood be performed mentally only
after a deliberate choice to set one's mind to the task and only with
prolonged and focused concentration.
In contrast, other acts of thinking just seem to happen. When
people say that their minds jump to a logical conclusion, they do not
understand the process to involve one part of their minds-the part in
which volition is determined-instructing another part to jump or
engage in the logical operation. These acts of thinking are involuntary
or reflexive. For example, if Joe tells Jane (1) that he parked his
109. But see infra note 124 (discussing automatism and the light-bulb-in-the-
shower myth).
110. See Collins, supra note 2, at Part III.C. 1.
111. 409 U.S. 63, 74 (1972).
112. The Court construed the claims broadly enough to read on more than mere
computer implementation of the recited operations. See id. at 68 (noting that the
method may be performed "without any apparatus"). One of the two claims before the
Court, however, arguably was limited to computer implementation. See id. at 73
(reciting one claim requiring the step of "storing the ... signals in a reentrant shift
register"). The Court did not address the propertization of thought in Benson.
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convertible outside with the top down and (2) that it is raining, Jane
does not need to consciously decide to work through a syllogistic
reasoning process with unstated intermediate premises (e.g., "things
exposed to the sky get wet if it is raining" and "most things parked
outside are exposed to the sky") to realize that the interior of Joe's car
is probably getting wet. Jane reaches the conclusion automatically.
A doctor who performs the correlating step of Claim 13 of the
'658 patent thinks reflexively. If a doctor is exposed to the premises of
the claimed act of reasoning, the doctor's mind automatically jumps to
the diagnosis. A doctor who has read about the inventor's discovery
and who looks at the results of a patient's homocysteine test instantly
reaches a conclusion about whether or not the patient has a vitamin B12
deficiency. Claim 13 is a reflexive-thought-propertizing claim.
The intuition that some acts of thinking are reflexive and not
preceded by volition to think is reinforced by the "dual-process theory"
in cognitive psychology."13 The dual-process model distinguishes
between two systems of human reasoning that coexist in the human
mind and that perform differently in terms of speed and
controllability."' System 1 reasoning is "quick," "intuitive," and
"effortless";'' 5 it is "implicit," "unconscious," and "automatic."' 6 In
contrast, System 2 reasoning is "slow," "effortful," "deliberate," and
"rule" -oriented;' it is "explicit," "conscious," and "controllable."'
In sum, "[t]he assumption is that System 2 thinking is . . .volitional
• . .whereas System 1 thinking is not."" 9 The dual process theory
reinforces the notion that some System 1 thinking is "rapid, parallel and
113. See generally KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO IS RATIONAL? STUDIES OF
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING 144-48 (1999); JONATHAN ST. B. T. EVANS &
DAVID E. OVER, RATIONALITY AND REASONING 141-62 (1996); Daniel Kahneman &
Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
THINKING AND REASONING 267-88 (Keith J. Holyoak et al. eds., 2005); Steven A.
Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 379-96 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Jonathan St. B. T.
Evans, In Two Minds.- Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCIENCES 454 (2003) [hereinafter Evans, Two Minds]; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Logic
and Human Reasoning.- An Assessment of the Deduction Paradigm, 128 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 978, 988-89 (2002) [hereinafter Evans, Reasoning]. Cf also MOORE, supra note
77, at 49 n.6 (distinguishing a "mental act" that "I can will myself" to perform and
other "mental states" that are basically passive and not "willable").
114. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 113, at 267. Some neurophysiologists
argue that the two systems operate in spatially distinct parts of the brain. Evans, Two
Minds, supra note 113, at 456.
115. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 113, at 267-68.
116. Evans, Reasoning, supra note 113, at 989.
117. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 113, at 267-68, 288.
118. Evans, Reasoning, supra note 113, at 989.
119. Evans, Two Minds, supra note 113, at 456.
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automatic in nature" 20 and thus beyond the control of the thinker, just




The dual process theory also offers some insight into what types of
thinking are likely to be performed reflexively. Among its other
characteristics, System 1 thinking is commonly implicated "when we
make practical decisions that help us to achieve our personal goals." 2
It is pragmatic, contextualized, and based on previously held beliefs.12 3
In contrast, System 2 thought is often so abstract that people cannot use
their previously held beliefs and so counterfactual that people must fight
against their previously held beliefs. 1
24
C Propertizing Reflexive Thought
Claims that propertize reflexive acts of thinking raise the same
problem of constructive nonvolition introduced above in Part I on a
new scale that patent law has never previously confronted.
120. Id. at 454.
121. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
122. EVANS & OVER, supra note 113, at 147.
123. Evans, Reasoning, supra note 113, at 989.
124. Id. The object of introducing the dual-process theory is not to scientify the
law on constructive nonvolition in patent infringement cases involving reflexive-
thought-propertizing claims. Courts grappling with such cases should not treat the
classification of the claimed act of thinking as an example of System I or System 2
thought as dispositive of whether a thinker appropriated the entitlement with an
involuntary or voluntary act, respectively. The System 1-System 2 distinction is not a
strict dichotomy; the variables that distinguish the two systems are continuous, not
binary. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 113, at 288. Classifications are not even
stable: a mental task can migrate from System 2 to System 1 for a particular thinker as
a thinker becomes familiar with it. Id. at 268 (discussing automatism and giving the
example of the "proverbial chess master who strolls past a game and quips, 'White
mates in three"'). Furthermore, the dual-process theory often suggests "both/and"
rather than "either/or" answers. For many problems, System 1 provides snap
judgments and offers a form of rough-and-ready, bias-prone thinking that leans heavily
on factual context and previously held beliefs. System 2 kicks in after a time delay and
corrects errors by undertaking a normatively driven and rule-based analysis of the
problem. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 51-52 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). Finally, the System 2
label may not be of much legal import at all. The light-bulb-in-the-shower myth of how
people often solve complex puzzles when least expected suggests that people may not
have the ability to turn their minds off and prevent themselves from engaging in System
2 thinking. A cognitive scientist's notion that thinking is volitional may be very
different from a judge's notion that bodily actions are volitional. The latter notion
involves legally purposive acts because people can choose both to perform and not to
perform them.
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To the extent that involuntary-act cases are contingent on trips,
power outages, and fainting spells befalling the defendant, they are rare
and monetarily insignificant. 125 However, because the PTO is issuing
reflexive-thought-propertizing claims, the extraordinary is no longer
necessary to tell a story that involves an involuntarily performed,
entitlement-appropriating act. Claims reciting reflexive acts of thinking
describe a type of mental activity that includes a very high percentage
of involuntarily performed and allegedly infringing act-of-thinking
tokens.
Furthermore, involuntary appropriation of the entitlement
described in a reflexive-thought-propertizing claim is made easier
because the inventiveness of the method resides in the step that is
commonly performed in an involuntary manner. If the inventiveness of
the claim resides in a step that is by default performed deliberately,
then only a deliberate act can appropriate the entitlement even if the
claim also recites steps that are commonly performed reflexively. 12 6 If it
is the step that makes the method patentable that is commonly
performed in a reflexive manner, however, a defendant who is doing
nothing more than practicing the prior art is more likely to involuntarily
appropriate the claimed entitlement. 127 Reflexive acts of thinking are
unusual in that they are both occasionally inventive 128 and routinely
performed involuntarily. 12
9
In sum, a defendant who performs the entitlement-appropriating
act in an involuntary manner is no longer the exception. He or she may
represent the norm in infringement actions involving reflexive-thought-
propertizing claims.
125. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (offering hypotheticals to
illustrate constructive nonvolition in involuntary-acts cases).
126. More accurately, involuntarily acts appropriate the entitlement only in
exceptional cases involving trips, power-outages, and fainting spells.
127. The heightened possibility of a reflexive act appropriating a patent
entitlement is contingent on the reflexive act being the final act of a claim. The addition
of a deliberate, noninventive step to a claim after the reflexive act of thinking can also
eliminate routine, involuntary acts that appropriate the entitlement. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 210-11 (discussing thought-propertizing claims with post thought
speech limitations).
128. An act of reasoning of a known type (e.g., a statistical syllogism) is
arguably novel and nonobvious whenever it incorporates newly discovered and
unexpected factual information as a premise. The only reason why the act of
"correlating" in Claim 13 is novel and nonobvious is because the statistical
generalization linking homocysteine and vitamin B12 was new and unexpected at the
time of the invention.
129. The unusual nature of this combination is highlighted by the difficulty of a
claim-drafting exercise in which the assignment is to formulate a method claim in which
a reflexive bodily act such as "blinking" is the inventive step.
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Not all defendants in infringement cases involving reflexive-
thought-propertizing claims are constructively nonvolitional
appropriators. Some thinkers who act involuntarily when their conduct
is narrowly framed should be held liable as infringers. 13 ° However,
there will be quantitatively many more involuntary-act cases if the PTO
continues to issue reflexive-thought-propertizing claims. The shift from
extramental to mental activity as the referent of a patent claim radically
increases what is at stake in a court's decision to adopt or reject a
constructive-nonvolition defense.
D. Two Types of Entitlements
This Section draws a distinction between two types of entitlements
to reflexive acts of thinking: freestanding, reflexive acts of thinking and
irrevocable bundles. The distinction is not a strict dichotomy. It
establishes two poles of a spectrum that measures the degree of control
that potential defendants can exercise in their attempts to avoid
appropriating a patent entitlement. Even if idealized, this distinction
proves useful for systematically grappling with the problem that
constructive nonvolition raises vis-A-vis reflexive-thought-propertizing
claims and identifying why Claim 13 of the '658 patent in particular is
a special type of reflexive-thought-propertizing claim that merits closer
attention.
1. FREESTANDING, REFLEXIVE ACTS OF THINKING
Some reflexive-thought-propertizing claims create entitlements to
freestanding, reflexive acts of thinking. Consider a method claim that
only recites the "correlating" step of Claim 13. This truncated version
of Claim 13 is as novel and nonobvious as the real Claim 13.131 A
doctor infringes this hypothetical, one-step variant of Claim 13 in many
situations. The doctor might read the results of an individual's
homocysteine test published in a newspaper or on a chart of another
doctor's patient. The doctor might remember the results of a
130. See supra text accompanying note 87 (presenting the Jane hypothetical in
an involuntary-act case).
131. Even if the courts were to hold that Claim 13 recites patentable subject
matter under section 101, they might conclude that this hypothetical, one-step variant of
Claim 13 does not. See In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2007 WL 2728361, at *10
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) (invalidating a broad claim reciting a business method that
can be performed without a machine under the mental-steps doctrine).
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homocysteine test performed at some point in the past. 13 2 Patients might
even infringe if they learn of both their own homocysteine test results
and the statistical generalization linking vitamin B12 and homocysteine.
If strict liability is equated with absolute liability, an entitlement to
a freestanding, reflexive act of thinking is essentially an entitlement to
others' involuntary conduct. The conduct described by the claim is
performed involuntarily in a narrow time window, and potential
defendants have no reasonable degree of control over their ability to
avoid mental exposure to the information that triggers the claimed,
reflexive act.
The need for a constructive-nonvolition exemption for
appropriators of entitlements to freestanding, reflexive acts of thinking
is self-evident.'33 A per se entitlement to others' involuntary conduct
produces a property regime that is riddled with Pareto-inferior,
judicially forced exchanges, violating both the reward and baseline
principles. Because the equation of strict liability and absolute liability
is absurd with respect to claims to freestanding, reflexive acts of
thinking, this Article gives such claims no further attention. 134
132. Reflexive-thought-propertizing claims that do not recite data-gathering
steps raise an additional "counting" problem: if a doctor reads the results of a
homocysteine test and then recalls the results an hour later, has the doctor infringed
once or twice?
133. Rather than looking for constructive nonvolition on a case-by-case basis,
the courts may invalidate all claims that can be routinely appropriated through
involuntary acts and head off the costs of administering a constructive-nonvolition
exemption at the pass. See infra text accompanying note 208.
134. Although it eventually proves unsuccessful, the most honest attempt at a
justification for a rule of per se liability for appropriating entitlements to freestanding,
reflexive acts of thinking sounds in restitution, not property. Defined broadly,
restitution is the law of "benefit-based recovery." HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 1 (2004). As Professor Wendy Gordon has illustrated, the
plight of the producer of information goods who receives no intellectual property
protection can readily be analogized to the plight of a plaintiff in restitution. See
Gordon, supra note 37, at 463 (framing an author seeking compensation as a plaintiff in
restitution); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 221-66 (1992) (arguing that a slimmed-
down version of copyright can be justified by the law of restitution).
The story that portrays the inventor of a reflexive act of thinking as a plaintiff in
restitution casts the inventor who publishes inventive information as a bestower of a
benefit on the public. The public is usually better off after having learned the inventive
information than it was before, even if the marginal benefit provided by the information
is a small one. The public that learned the inventive information and that put it to use
by thinking about it, however, did not request the benefit. There is no contract. The
inventor, therefore, must sue in restitution, argue that the reflexively thinking public
has been unjustly enriched at the inventor's expense, and demand payment.
The inventor faces an uphill battle attempting to convince the court that he or she
is a meritorious plaintiff in restitution. Restitution frowns on plaintiffs like the inventor.
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When the bestower of an unrequested, nonmonetary benefit seeks recovery from the
benefited party, the bestower is dismissed as a "volunteer" or "officious intermeddler"
without recourse in the law. John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1409 (1974); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 23 & cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, April 1, 2002). The strong,
negative rule against restitution is traditionally justified based on the need for the courts
to respect the benefited parties' autonomy- and efficiency-enhancing freedom to order
their own priorities. DAGAN, supra, at 140-41. Markets and the voluntary exchanges
that they entail, not judicially forced exchanges, are the preferred means of facilitating
the exchange of goods. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 68-
69 (1985) ("[T]he general law of restitution seeks to encourage private bargaining
rather than to replace it with judicial intervention."). The courts should not force John
to compensate someone who comes and paints his house while he is on vacation. John
should be able to decide when his house gets painted and choose the services that best
match his price and quality preferences. Furthermore, if anyone who paints his house
gets paid in restitution, a competitive market for house-painting services never
develops.
This traditional justification of the officious intermeddler rule, however, leaves
the inventor of the reflexive act of thinking with room to argue that he or she deserves
an exception. A justification of the officious-intermeddler rule that relies on the rule's
role in facilitating private bargaining cannot explain the inventor's inability to recover
in restitution. The inventor is in a different position than the house painter. Denying the
inventor a right to recover in restitution will not create a robust market for inventive
information. Inventive information is a public good, see supra note 19, and the market
failures associated with public goods are well known. An inventor cannot identify the
people who value his or her inventive information before he or she invents it, and, even
if the proper parties could be identified, contracting for the delivery of information that
does not yet exist is not a simple task. See Gordon, supra, at 233-38 (discussing the
search costs and strategic bargaining problems that confront authors who try to reach ex
ante contracts guaranteeing payment for their works). Nor will eventual consumers of
inventive information know to seek out an inventor because, by definition, they don't
know about the inventive information before the invention occurs. The inventor may
therefore reasonably argue that voluntary exchanges of inventive information in a
market based on ex ante contracts are not feasible and that an exception to the rule
against recovery in restitution for the bestowal of unrequested benefits should apply and
allow him to recover the benefit that he or she bestows on involuntary thinkers.
The inventor would not be the first to explore such an exception. In his book on
restitution, Hanoch Dagan proposed a "collective-goods" exception from the general,
negative "officious intermeddler" rule of restitution when the benefit in question
involves significant externalities vis-A-vis the benefit-provider and a collective action
problem is likely to prevent a market for the provisioning of the good from developing.
DAGAN, supra, at 130-48 (defending a collective-goods exception that is not reflected
in contemporary doctrine). At the end of the day, however, even Dagan's collective-
goods exception would not help the inventor of the reflexive act of thinking in his plea
to the court. Dagan imposes two restrictions on his exception, and the inventor cannot
satisfy either.
First, Dagan argues that recovery in restitution for an unrequested benefit under
the collective-goods exception can only be justified if it is "objectively clear that . . .
defendants' proportionate benefit exceeds the cost to them of contributing the
proportionate share of the cost of supplying the benefit." Id. at 135. Patent damages
have no relation to the cost of producing the inventive information, see supra note 21
and accompanying text, so the patent law reward that the inventor seeks for the benefit
2007:759 Constructive Non volition in Patent Law 801
2. IRREVOCABLE BUNDLES
Claim 13 of the '658 patent is a special type of reflexive-thought-
propertizing claim because it satisfies three conditions. First, a data-
gathering step limits the scope of the claim. A doctor only infringes
Claim 13 if he or she initially tests for homocysteine and then
correlates. Second, the data-gathering act is by default deliberate and
deterrable.135 Third, the act of thinking always follows the gathering of
is not related to his "cost of supplying the benefit." Furthermore, involuntary thinkers
are likely to subjectively devalue the benefit obtained from the inventive act of thinking
in relation to the traditional patent law remedy. The collective-goods exception is
appropriate (and subjective devaluation is low) only when the interests of the plaintiffs
and defendants in restitution are "locked in." DAGAN, supra, at 131. When the plaintiff
and defendants are locked in, the agency costs-the costs generated when "decisions by
the agent . . . deviate from the decisions which would have been made by the principal
if he had the same information and talents as the agent"-are low. Id. at 138-49
(quoting 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 39 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1987)) (internal quotations omitted). Rarely are the interests of an inventor of a
reflexive act of thinking locked in with all of the people who reflexively perform the act
of thinking.
Second, Dagan argues that recovery in restitution under the collective-goods
exception is only appropriate if the cause of action in restitution is the likely but-for
cause of the production of the benefit. Id. at 131, 135. There is nothing inherently
inefficient or wrong with positive externalities that go uninternalized. Dawson, supra,
at 1412 ("Uncompensated gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being and
survival depend on them."); Gordon, supra, at 167-69 (arguing that "[c]ulture is
interdependence" and that free riding is not inherently wrongful); Lemley, supra note
23,. at 1046-69 (defending the efficiency-enhancing role of free riding in intellectual
property). Welfare spillovers are detrimental only if they are sufficiently large to
destroy the incentive of any individual (or group capable of concerted action) to
generate a good or benefit. DAGAN, supra, at 131 (arguing that restitution should be
employed to solve a collective-action problem "only in types of cases where freeriding
may frustrate the possibility of achieving the collective good itself" absent recovery in
restitution); Lemley, supra note 23 (arguing that intellectual property is justified only to
the extent that it is necessary to encourage invention). It is highly questionable whether
recovery by patentees from constructively nonvolitional appropriators is necessary to
ensure the production of a distinct class of information. If patent protection were to be
denied in an entire industry such as biotechnology, then a particular class of inventive
information might not be produced. However, when the additional protection sought is
recovery from constructively nonvolitional thinkers, it is entirely possible that the
patentee is merely trying to internalize spillovers from an otherwise profitable venture.
The underlying information protected by claims to freestanding, reflexive acts of
thinking may be partially protected by enforcement against appropriators who do not
fall within the constructive-nonvolition exemption and by other, traditional patent
claims. Cf supra text accompanying note 99 (noting that the researchers who
discovered the vitamin B12 correlation also invented a patentable method of assaying
for homocysteine).
135. Claim 13 may be appropriated nonvolitionally under exceptional
circumstances. An overworked and underslept resident might scribble in a box on a
diagnostic form in a state of automatism and thus order a homocysteine test. The
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the data that enables the reflexive thought. When these three conditions
exist, the entitlement described by the claim is an irrevocable bundle of
a data-gathering step and the inventive, reflexive act of thinking. If a
claim describes an irrevocable bundle rather than a freestanding,
reflexive act of thinking, the entitlement at issue need not be viewed as
an entitlement to others' involuntary conduct. The entitlement describes
the data-gathering-act-of-thinking bundle and is appropriated by a
deliberate act in all but exceptional cases.
The concept of an irrevocable bundle conceptually reframes what
the inventor has actually invented. Like an alien invader or virus, the
reflexive nature of the act of thinking incorporates the act of thinking
into the very being of preexisting data-gathering technology from the
date of invention forward. Although the data-gathering step existed
before the discovery of the reflexive act of thinking, the two cannot be
separated after the discovery (and after exhaustive publication of the
statistical generalization that enables the reflexive act of thinking). It is
entirely beyond the power of a doctor who gathers data about an
individual's homocysteine level to perform the data-gathering step
without also performing the reflexive act of thinking. The doctor cannot
order a different product that does not have the vitamin-deficiency
diagnosis feature; the reflexive act of thinking cannot be removed from
the product through redesign. The doctor cannot even contractually
agree not to engage in the act of thinking. There is neither a physical
nor a legal means to dissociate the data-gathering step from the act of
thinking.
13 6
The act of invention coupled with widespread publication
irrevocably transforms what had been a plain old homocysteine test into
the test bundled together with the reflexive act of thinking. The theory
of an irrevocable bundle is similar to the polymorph and seeding
theories put forward in SmithKlin/e.137 Before the invention of Form
Two PHC, Form One PHC was available as a distinct product. From
the date of the invention forward (with a bit of a lag to allow the
seeding process to take place), Form One only existed in a bundle with
trace amounts of Form Two. A reflexive-thought-propertizing claim.
that marks an entitlement to an irrevocable bundle accomplishes this
remainder of this Article ignores this exceptional case and presumes that only deliberate
acts appropriate claims to irrevocable bundles.
136. A doctor may, however, contractually agree not to express or act on the
conclusion of the reflexive act of thinking. Cf infra text accompanying notes 210-11
(discussing reflexive-thought-propertizing claims with express speech limitations).
137. See supra text accompanying note 53 (describing SmithKline's polymorph
theory).
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end by using the human mind as an intermediate entity to indelibly
bond an inventive act of thinking onto a preexisting data-gathering step.
There are several reasons for examining entitlements to irrevocable
bundles as a category that is distinct from entitlements to freestanding,
reflexive acts of thinking. Most significantly, if the bundle itself is the
invention, then requiring potential defendants to avoid performing the
data-gathering step is not a request that is overbroad with respect to
what is required to avoid appropriating the entitlement. The immediate
act of appropriation is by default willed and deterrable. In other words,
entitlements to irrevocable bundles give rise to deliberate-act, not
involuntary-act, cases, and the red flag for a constructive-nonvolition
exemption arguably flies lower in the deliberate-acts cases. 138 Claims to
irrevocable bundles also appear to be the type of reflexive-thought-
propertizing claims that are most commonly sought by patent applicants
and issued by the PTO. "Test and correlate" claims are commonplace
in the medical profession, 139 and they provide a template that can be
used in any field of technology. '4 In part, the empirical prevalence of
claims to irrevocable bundles may flow from the fact that that claims to
freestanding, reflexive acts of thinking wear the problems of
constructive nonvolition and the propertization of thought on their
sleeves. In part, it may flow from the lower cost of monitoring for
infringement. The thinkers' requests for the relevant data can often
meter infringement of an irrevocable bundle. Finally, claims to
irrevocable bundles merit special attention to shine light on the
constructive-nonvolition problem in the very form that confronted and
bested the Supreme Court in Laboratory Corp.
IV. IRREVOCABLE BUNDLES AND LABORA TORY CORP.
This Part argues that claims to irrevocable bundles are overbroad
without a constructive-nonvolition exemption from liability for patent
138. See supra note 88.
139. For example, a district court recently addressed a claim to a method of
detecting autism comprising the steps: "obtaining" a sample, "analyzing" the sample
for the presence of certain compounds, and "correlating the quantity of . . .at least one
compound with an autism condition or lack thereof in said patient." Great Plains Lab.,
Inc. v. Metrametrix Clinical Lab., No. 04-2125, 2006 WL 2663680 (D. Kan. Sept. 15,
2006) (construing the term "correlating"); U.S. Patent No. 5,686,311, cols. 16-17
(Nov. 11, 1997); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126
S. Ct. 2921, 2929 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Solicitor General
opined that the Court's ruling in Laboratory Corp. would affect a "substantial number
of patent claims").
140. Collins, supra note 2, at Part II (demonstrating that Claim 13 of the '658




infringement. It contrasts the conventional story of a complement good
that is an improvement on existing technology with the story that casts
an irrevocable bundle as an improvement. It illustrates the distinct
problems of economic and constitutional overbreadth that result if
courts equate strict liability with absolute liability. It analyzes the lower
courts' treatment of a claim to an irrevocable bundle in Laboratory
Corp., emphasizing both the overbreadth that resulted from the lower
courts' rulings and the intricate nature of the factual inquiry that is
required to distinguish infringers from constructively nonvolitional
appropriators.
A. Irrevocable Bundles and Improvement
An irrevocable bundle is an unusual kind of improvement
invention. It overrides a fail-safe mechanism on which patent law relies
to police both the reward and baseline principles.
To understand the novelty of an irrevocable bundle (both in the
patent law sense of novelty and in the sense of the newness of the legal
problem that an irrevocable bundle creates), it is helpful to think about
the data-gathering step and the reflexive act of thinking as distinct
goods. The noninventive data-gathering step is good X, and the
inventive reflexive act of thought is good Y. 141 In Claim 13 of the '658
patent, good X is the act of testing for homocysteine, and good Y is the
mental act of using the vitamin B12 correlation to diagnose the patient.
Good Y is an improvement invention in the sense that it makes good X
more valuable and increases demand for good X, but not in the sense
that good Y supplants sales of good X. In other words, good Y is an
improvement on good X in the form of complement rather than a
substitute. 14 2 Furthermore, good Y is a perfect complement to good X
because good Y can only be used in conjunction with good X. 14 3 A
doctor can only perform the correlating step after testing for
homocysteine.144
141. But cf infra text accompanying notes 154-55 (noting that X and Y are not
distinct goods in an economic sense if they are perfect, mutual complements).
142. Complement goods tend to be used together. Two goods are mutual
complement goods if a decrease in price of good X increases demand for good Y and
vice versa. In contrast, substitute goods tend to be used in the alternative. Two goods
are mutual substitute goods if an increase in the price of good X increases the demand
for good Y and vice versa. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 19, at 25-26, 34-35,
109-10.
143. Id. at 70.
144. If good Y were not the act of thinking about the vitamin B12 correlation
required to diagnose a patient but instead were an act of thinking about the vitamin B12
correlation generically, it would not be a perfect complement.
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Invention scenarios involving goods like X and Y (at least as
described so far) are well-known staples of patent law. Preexisting good
X can be a pencil and inventive good Y can be a wedge-shaped eraser
cap that fits over the nonwriting end of the pencil. The invention of the
eraser cap increases demand for the pencil because the pencil is now a
more useful object, and the eraser cap is, for all practical purposes,
useless without the pencil.145 Good Y can just as well be a better pencil
sharpener, a chemical that is only useful for producing a yellow,
graspable coating for pencils, or a new method of using a pencil (but
not a pen) to perform calculus rapidly.
In these traditional, complement-good invention scenarios, good X
is not physically changed by the invention of good Y, and it remains a
market option after the invention of good Y. Pencils still exist after the
invention of eraser caps. When good X is a data-gathering step and
good Y is a reflexive act of thought that together form an irrevocable
bundle, however, good X does not remain a market option after the
invention of good Y. The very invention and publication of the
reflexive act of correlating irrevocably transforms the data-gathering
step into a data-gathering-reflexive-act-of-thinking bundle. After the
invention of good Y, good X ceases to exist, and only good XY exists.
With respect to Claim 13, the invention of the act of correlating
homocysteine and B12 vitamins makes the purchase of the
homocysteine test "neat" a factual impossibility. Only the
homocysteine-test-act-of-correlating-to-B12-vitamins bundle persists in
the postinvention world.
Recounting the traditional invention scenario in a manner that
captures the nature of an irrevocable bundle requires narrating the story
in a "Bizzaro World." It is as if the very invention of the eraser cap
miraculously, physically, and indelibly bonds eraser caps onto all of the
ordinary pencils that will ever be manufactured. Irrevocable bundles
created by the invention of a reflexive act of thought raise an
unprecedented factual scenario of invention in which perfect
complement goods that improve on preexisting goods are factually
compulsory. 146
In the traditional complement-good improvement scenario, the
continued availability of the unimproved good is a fail-safe that
145. The required assumption is that nobody uses an eraser cap to erase unless
it is on the end of a pencil. An eraser cap might be small and therefore, unlike a normal
eraser, difficult to hold while erasing.
146. The plaintiffs allegations in SmithKline fit nicely into this "Bizzaro
World." See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. However, the Form Two (good




prevents violations of both the reward and baseline principles.'47 Any
claim that is justified by the inventiveness of good Y, yet is broad
enough to afford the patentee monopoly power in the market for
preexisting good X, is invalid for lack of novelty or nonobviousness. A
patent based on the invention of the eraser cap does not normally affect
the public's right to enter the market for pencils without eraser caps.
When the improvement good Y is irrevocably bundled with the
preexisting good X, however, the preexisting good X does not remain a
market option after the invention of the improvement. After the
improvement invention, the preexisting good X no longer exists as an
independent thing. The fail-safe protection for the reward and baseline
principles malfunctions. Anyone who desires to use good X must
purchase good XY because good XY is the only form in which good X
persists in the postinvention world. Furthermore, a claim to the
irrevocable XY bundle that affords the patentee monopoly power in the
market for good X is not invalidated by the novelty or nonobviousness
doctrines. The presence of good Y in the bundle assures the
inventiveness of the claim to the XY bundle, just like the presence of
the inventive eraser cap in the pencil-and-eraser-cap ensures the
inventiveness of that combination. As with other constructive-
nonvolition cases, the potential problem is not a problem of the figure
of the claim being too large on its face vis-A-vis what is new but a
problem with the ground beyond the reach of the claim being too small.
B. Economic Overbreadth
An entitlement to an irrevocable bundle is often economically
overbroad unless a court recognizes a constructive-nonvolition
exemption to liability for patent infringement. 148 Data-gathering steps in
irrevocable bundles vary along a continuous spectrum from purely
monovalent (those rare activities that are useful only for a single
purpose, namely to perform the reflexive act of thought) to highly
polyvalent (those more common activities that are useful for diverse
purposes). An entitlement to an irrevocable bundle that incorporates a
polyvalent data-gathering step violates the reward principle if strict
liability is equated with absolute liability. The overbreadth is
eliminated, however, if courts do not subject constructively
nonvolitional appropriators to liability. In contrast, an entitlement
147. See supra Part II.A. 1-2 (explaining the reward and baseline principles).
148. The economic overbreadth implicates both the reward and baseline
principles because it extracts payments from people who are trying to practice
privileges that they value and possess in PW1.
806
2007:759 Constructive Non volition in Patent Law
incorporating a purely monovalent data-gathering step is not overbroad
in an economic sense in the first place.
If the inventor claims an irrevocable bundle, the data-gathering
step is polyvalent, and defendants are per se liable whenever they
appropriate the inventor's entitlement to an irrevocable bundle, then the
inventor's right to exclude is broader than what can be justified by the
reward and baseline principles. As the following figures illustrate, the
inventor's monopoly power derives in part from demand for technology




FIGURE 3a FIGURE 3b
Good X is a preexisting good (e.g., a data-gathering step), and
goods Y and Z are perfect complement goods (e.g., acts of applied
reasoning that both use the data generated by good X as a premise but
that are useful for distinct purposes). Good X is polyvalent because
goods Y and Z are both perfect complement goods.'49 Figure 3a depicts
demand in a hypothetical world in which good X "neat" continues to
exist as a factual matter after the invention of goods Y and Z. In this
world, the intentional bundles X+Y and X+Z have their own, unique
demand curves. Consumers' willingness to pay for X+Y determines
the reward that the inventor can reap from acting as a rational
monopolist of good Y.' 50 The inventor's profit is unaffected by the
149. The intrinsic value of good X, in addition to its use in a patented method,
may render good X polyvalent. However, goods in this part are sliced so finely that an
applied act of thinking is a good that is distinct from the test that produces the data
being thought about, so the contrast of X + Y and X + Z is more in line with the spirit of
the exercise.
150. To further the parallel to an irrevocable bundle, the argument presumes
that the owner of a patent on good Y can monopolize the intentional, nonirrevocable
X + Y bundle. If good Y is a perfect complement of good X and the market for good X
is competitive, this presumption is justified because the profits from monopolies on Y
and X+Y are usually identical. Under these circumstances, patentees who "tie" the
sale of good Y to good X do not increase their monopoly profits. They merely leverage
their market power into a larger number of sales of good X (pencils) at a competitive
price based on their monopoly power in the market for good Y (eraser caps). However,
a patentee who invents and claims good Y yet who sells only the X +Y bundle may run
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demand for good Z, assuming that goods Y and Z are neither substitute
nor complement goods. Figure 3b tells a different story. It illustrates
what happens when the invention of good Y results in a good XY
irrevocable bundle. The demand curve for the irrevocable bundle XY in
Figure 3b is the horizontal sum of the two demand curves in Figure
3a. '5 Good X plain and simple no longer exists, so consumers who
desire Y must purchase XY and consumers who value Z must purchase
the bundle XY+Z (or XYZ if Z, too, irrevocably bundles itself to X).
The owner of the entitlement to the irrevocable bundle profits from
consumers who desire only good Z (or bundle X +Z), a good that does
not embody the inventive information produced by the patentee.
Furthermore, consumers who value good Y pay more to the patentee
when irrevocable bundling occurs than when it does not occur. This
result both shifts surplus from consumers to producers and generates
additional dead-weight loss."5 2
The more polyvalent the technology and the further good Z
proliferates into goods Zi, Z2, and Z3, the more egregious the violation
of the reward principle is likely to be. In the same vein, the less
afoul of the tying doctrines in both patent misuse and antitrust law if the markets for X
and Y are distinct and the patentee has market power in the market for good Y. See
Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating
the per se rule for tying under patent misuse); 9 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1702 (noting
that an "anticompetitive effect" or "some relevant foreclosure" in the market for the
tied good is required for an actionable tying offence under the antitrust laws).
151. The demand for the irrevocable bundle that incorporates a polyvalent data-
gathering step can be obtained through horizontal summation if the group of consumers
represented on the demand curve for X + Y has no overlap with the group of consumers
represented on the demand curve for X+Z. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 19, at
116-17. In the context of Claim 13, horizontal summation is appropriate even if the
same doctor appears on both curves, but only if the doctor performs the two
homocysteine tests on different patients (and wealth effects are ignored). However, if a
single doctor-patient pairing is represented on both demand curves, then that
consumer's demand in the possible world with irrevocable bundling should be
calculated through a vertical, not horizontal, summation of the demand curves
willingness. Cf infra note 165 (considering consumers with mixed motives).
152. In the "Bizzaro World" hypothetical involving the irrevocable bundling of
a pencil and an eraser cap, see supra text accompanying note 146, irrevocable bundling
allows the inventor of the eraser cap to profit from pencils purchased by people who
place no value on eraser caps such as writers who never make mistakes and model
enthusiasts who use pencils to build log cabins. To add insult to injury, these pencil
purchasers must pay the inventor of the eraser cap a supracompetitive price that reflects
monopoly control over the entire market for pencils, not merely the price that could
have been earned by a monopoly in the market for severable eraser caps. But cf infra
note 153 (describing situations in which a monopoly on an irrevocable bundle lowers
the price and increases the consumption of the inventive, complement good).
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valuable the inventive, complement good Y is relative to the
nor.inventive, complement good Z, the more egregious the violation.'53
In contrast, if the noninventive data-gathering steps incorporated
into an irrevocable bundle are purely monovalent, then an entitlement
to the irrevocable bundle never violates the reward principle. When
good X is purely monovalent, good X and good Y are perfect, mutual
complements; there is no demand for one without the other. In
economic terms, X and Y are not even distinct goods in this situation.'54
There is no area under the demand curve for good X+Z in Figure 3a,
so the demand curve for the irrevocable bundle XY does not move
when the two demand curves are summed in Figure 3b. The public is
economically indifferent to the disappearance of good X plain and
simple and the replacement of good X by good XY in the postinvention
world. 55
153. Under certain circumstances, consumers who desire the inventive good Y
rather than the noninventive good Z are ironically better off in a world with irrevocable
bundling than they are in a world without it. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3c in
which the labels on the two demand curves from Figure 3b are flipped:
- - - - - XV 18l
FIGURE 3c
The rational monopolist charges a lower price for the irrevocable XY bundle than he or
she does for the intentionally bundled good X+Y in the closest possible world without
irrevocable bundling. However, the reward-principle violation that results from the
irrevocable bundling is much more severe. There is nothing inherent in the factual-legal
conception of an irrevocable bundle that suggests that irrevocable bundles will create
problems that resemble Figure 3b more closely than they resemble Figure 3c. The
Figure 3c problems, however, are more likely to make a judge at least raise an eyebrow
before equating strict liability with absolute liability.
154. Cf 10 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1743a, 1751e (evidence of buyer
interest in a separate product is necessary to allege that two distinct products are tied
together). A common example of perfect, mutual complements is a pair of shoes, left
and right.
155. But cf infra Part IV.C (suggesting that irrevocable bundles that
incorporate purely monovalent goods might be constitutionally overbroad even if they
are not economically overbroad).
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The fact that irrevocable bundles incorporating purely monovalent
data-gathering steps are not economically overbroad, however, does
little to make the genus of reflexive-thought-propertizing claims as a
whole more palatable. Data-gathering technologies are unlikely to be
purely monovalent for three reasons. First, the data-gathering step is
never inventive in a thought-propertizing claim.156 Few technologies
will exist in a state of absolute economic uselessness prior to the
invention of a complement, improvement good. Second, the data-
gathering step must remain purely monovalent throughout the term of
the patent. If a data-gathering step is purely monovalent at the time of
invention but becomes polyvalent during the term of the patent, an
entitlement to an irrevocable bundle is economically overbroad
prospectively from the time the polyvalence develops.15 7
Third, a purely monovalent technology entails a restrictive
definition of uselessness. In patent law, the courts and the PTO
interpret the utility requirement to allow patents on any compound that
has a "specific and substantial utility. '''5 8 Viewed in the negative,
compounds that are only useful as inputs into further research to
achieve as-of-yet insufficiently specified goals are legally useless and
unpatentable.' 5 9 This utility-doctrine definition of uselessness, however,
is much broader than an economic definition of uselessness. The value
that the research community places on a technology as an input into
ongoing research activities demonstrates that the technology has an
economic use even if it does not have a use that is recognized by the
utility doctrine. More concretely, it is possible to conclude that
homocysteine tests have doctrinal utility only for diagnosing vitamin
B12 deficiencies and nonetheless also conclude that homocysteine tests
are not purely monovalent technologies. Consumer demand for use of
homocysteine tests in ongoing commercial research to develop new
correlations for homocysteine makes the homocysteine test a polyvalent
data-gathering step in an economic sense.' 6° A research-oriented use for
156. See supra text accompanying note 102 (defining the propertization of
thought).
157. The economic overbreadth that results after the discovery of new uses for
data-gathering steps that previously had been purely monovalent reaffirms that
constructive nonvolition must be measured in relation to all privileges in PWI, not only
in relation to privileges in the prior art. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text
(defining the contents of PWI).
158. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing PTO
guidelines).
159. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966) ("[A] patent is not
a hunting license.").
160. The narrowness of the category of "purely monovalent data-gathering
steps" also needs to be distinguished from the related-yet-broader category of
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good X means that goods X and Y are not perfect, mutual
complements. '61
Entitlements to irrevocable bundles are economically overbroad if
they allow an inventor to profit from demand for all of the uses of a
polyvalent technology that the inventor did not actually invent. A
constructive exemption from liability for patent infringement, however,
rectifies the economic overbreadth problem. 62 Constructive nonvolition
lets a defendant who appropriated a patent entitlement off the hook if
the cost to the defendant of reducing the benefit obtained from the
appropriation requires that the defendant retreat from the baseline of
privileges possessed and valued in PW1. 163
This standard effectively requires a court to determine which of the
two demand curves in Figure 3a reflects a particular defendant's initial
"nonstaple goods" that operates in the doctrines of contributory infringement and patent
misuse. The patentee has a legal right to exert some power in markets for unpatented,
nonstaple goods, but irrevocable bundles involving nonstaple data-gathering steps can
still be economically overbroad.
Companies that sell unpatented goods can be held secondarily liable for patent
infringement if, among other things, two conditions pertain. First, the unpatented good
must be a nonstaple good, i.e., it must not have a substantial, noninfringing use. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (limiting liability for contributory infringement to sales of
nonstaple goods); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)
(holding that a patentee does not commit patent misuse by suing all possible parties for
contributory infringement and making a license to practice a patent available only to
those who purchase the nonstaple good from the patentee). Second, the company selling
the nonstaple good is secondarily liable only if the purchaser of the unpatented good
uses it in a manner that infringes the patent. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1961) (holding that contributory infringement
cannot occur without direct infringement).
Because nonstaple goods may have insubstantial noninfringing uses, a weakly
polyvalent data-gathering step can be a nonstaple good. Although it is sometimes
implied that the doctrine of contributory infringement, coupled with the limitations on
the scope of patent misuse, allows a patentee to control markets for nonstaple goods,
this is technically an inaccurate statement. A patentee can control the market for the use
of a nonstaple good in a patented invention but not the market for the insubstantial uses
of a nonstaple good that are not infringing.
161. The research-oriented use of good X is not excused under the
contemporary common law experimental use doctrine if the research is commercial or
in any other way not "solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry." Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
162. In contrast, all appropriators of irrevocable bundles incorporating purely
monovalent technologies are infringers from an economic perspective. The value to the
defendant of using good X always lies in the value of good Y, so the cost to the
defendant of not appropriating is always equivalent to the opportunity cost of practicing
the PWI art.
163. See supra Part 11.B.
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willingness to pay for the irrevocable bundle. " On the one hand, if a
court decides that an appropriator of the irrevocable XY bundle
performed X because the appropriator valued Z, the appropriator can
succeed in proving a constructive-nonvolition defense. Both goods X
and Z exist in PW1. The cost to the defendant of reducing the benefit
obtained from good Y reflects not only the opportunity cost of avoiding
good Y but also the cost of forgoing the use of X+Z. On the other
hand, if a court decides that an appropriator of the irrevocable XY
bundle ordered X because the appropriator valued X+Y, then the
appropriator is an infringer. Because the defendant did not value Z, the
cost of not appropriating is no more than the opportunity cost of
practicing the art that exists in PW1. 165
To the extent that the reason for the existence of willingness to pay
can be equated with intent, the courts must determine the defendant's
intent in order to address constructive nonvolition. Intent, however, is
not used to identify innocent infringers. The defendant's knowledge of
the patent and reasonable belief in its invalidity remain irrelevant. 166
Discovery of the relevant intent requires an inquiry into the defendant's
motivation or purpose that gives rise to willingness to pay.
C Constitutional Overbreadth
Economic overbreadth is not the only repercussion of a court's
failure to recognize a constructive-nonvolition exemption from liability
for patent infringement when a reflexive-thought-propertizing claim
describes an irrevocable bundle. If courts equate strict liability with
absolute liability, an entitlement to an irrevocable bundle
unconstitutionally propertizes the prior art.
The Constitution does not give Congress the power to privatize the
technological status quo. The Copyright and Patent Clause grants
Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of . . .useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . .inventors the exclusive Right to their
164. In addition, a court must examine the defendant's postappropriation
behavior to see if the defendant could have reduced the benefit obtained from the
appropriation. See infra text accompanying note 207.
165. More difficult questions arise when defendants have mixed motives. These
defendants were assumed out of existence by the horizontal summation of the demand
curves in Figure 3a to create Figure 3b. See supra note 153. Insofar as economic
overbreadth is concerned, mixed-motive appropriators who would have been willing to
pay the going price for good X+Z in PWl should be constructively nonvolitional
appropriators even if their willingness to pay for the irrevocable bundle in the actual
world is attributable in part to a desire for good Y. But cf infra note 170 (discussing
defendants with mixed motives and constitutional overbreadth).
166. See supra note 5 (discussing innocent infringers).
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* . . Discoveries," '67 and the Supreme Court has interpreted this clause
to mean that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available." 1
68
A per se right to exclude from an irrevocable bundle does
precisely what the Court has prohibited Congress from doing. A
noninventive data-gathering step (good X) is by definition unpatentable
prior to the time of the invention. After the invention of a reflexive act
of thinking (good Y), the data-gathering step cannot be performed
without also performing the reflexive act of thinking. Only the
irrevocable bundle (good XY) exists. A right to exclude from the
bundle therefore restricts the availability of the preexisting data-
gathering step (good X). 16 9 If X+Z is in the prior art, then a patent that
is justified by the discovery of good Y cannot take the ability to
practice X + Z away from the public. 70
A constructive-nonvolition exemption from liability for patent
infringement is required to ensure that the prior art is not
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
168. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S 1, 6 (1966); see also Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Anderson's-Black Rock,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
169. This argument assumes a technological ontology that frames the data-
gathering step as the same technology both before and after the invention of the
reflexive act of thinking. In theory, a different ontology might overcome the
constitutional objection. The patentee could argue that the patent on the irrevocable
bundle does not propertize the prior art because the relevant prior-art technology ceased
to exist at the moment of the invention. Prior to the invention of the reflexive act of
thought, there was a data-gathering technology. After the invention, the data-gathering
technology no longer exists. Only a new, bundled technology exists-the data-
gathering-reflexive-act-of-thinking technology. This ontology suggests that a claim to
an irrevocable bundle only propertizes something that is novel and that it does not
propertize the prior art. This ontology suggests that it is the fault of the change in the
world wrought by the invention itself, not a fault attributable to patent doctrine, that the
post-invention practice of the prior art is impossible. Although the concept of an
irrevocable bundle is a useful economic concept, the Supreme Court is unlikely to adopt
such a counterintuitive ontology. The invention of a reflexive act of thinking about the
data generated by a homocysteine test likely does not make the homocysteine test a
thing that is different from the preinvention homocysteine test. However, if the
irrevocable bundling were to have a physical manifestation beyond our gray matter as it
did according to the plaintiffs allegations in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp., see supra text accompanying notes 52-53, the ontological argument that
irrevocable bundling produces a new technology and that the prior art vanishes might
carry the day and overcome a constitutional overbreadth challenge.
170. If the constitutional restriction on propertizing the prior art is strictly
applied, then any member of the public who places any value at all on X+Z or X
intrinsically should be able to appropriate the irrevocable XY bundle even if the
predominant motive of the appropriator is to obtain good Y.
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unconstitutionally privatized. 7' However, the constructive-nonvolition
exemption that is required to prevent constitutional overbreadth is likely
narrower than the exemption that is required to remedy economic
overbreadth. To the extent that the constitutional-overbreadth problem
derives from propertization of the prior art and not PW1 art,
technological advances that occur after the invention of the reflexive act
of thinking are irrelevant to a constitutionally required constructive-
nonvolition exemption. A restriction on PWl art that is not prior art
does not raise a constitutional issue. 172
D. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc.,173 the lower courts failed to identify all of the
constructively nonvolitional appropriators of Claim 13 of the '658
patent. They granted the patentee protection that was both economically
and constitutionally overbroad. To locate the point at which the courts
171. The Supreme Court's holding in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), does not conflict with this conclusion. In Rohm &Haas, the
Court held that a patentee can sue an unlicensed distributor of an unpatented, nonstaple
technology for contributory infringement without committing patent misuse. Id at 176.
Rohm & Haas involved a patent claim to a method of using a prior-art chemical as an
herbicide when no other substantial, noninfringing use for the chemical was known.
The patentee sought to become the sole distributor of the chemical, and it sued other
distributors for contributory infringement. The Court concluded that the patentee did
not misuse its patent rights in seeking to become the sole distributor of the nonstaple,
unpatented chemical. Id. at 220 (noting that the patentee's conduct "affect[ed] only the
market for the invention itself'). The patentee's conduct in Rohm & Haas sanctioned by
the Court did not take away from the public any rights to use the chemical that it
already possessed. Contributory infringement imposes secondary liability only when the
distributor sells the nonstaple chemical to a customer who performs the patented
method. See supra note 160. Contributory liability does not prevent the manufacture of
the unpatented chemical and its sale to noninfringing users (e.g., experimenters who are
searching for new uses for the chemical and who do not use it as an herbicide). Rohm
& Haas merely allows a patentee to control markets for the sale of unpatented products
to infringing customers. In contrast, a claim to an irrevocable bundle allows the
patentee to control all uses of the pre-existing technology-including the insubstantial
ones-if no constructive-nonvolition exemption exists.
172. The constitutional overbreadth of an irrevocable bundle may in another
way also be broader than its economic overbreadth. Irrevocable bundles incorporating
data-gathering steps that were purely monovalent prior to the invention are
constitutionally overbroad if the public seeks to use the data-gathering step alone.
However, given the narrow definition of a purely monovalent data-gathering step, see
supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text, cases involving defendants who seek to use
purely monovalent data-gathering steps for their own sake will be rare.
173. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted).
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took the wrong turn, this Section summarizes the judicial proceedings
and analyzes the lower courts' holding in two steps, first with a
simplifying assumption and then with the actual facts of the case.
1. COURT PROCEEDINGS
Laboratory Corp. brought a patent case involving a reflexive-
thought-propertizing claim all the way to the Supreme Court, but
neither the thought-propertizing nature of the claim nor the possibility
of constructive nonvolition were expressly raised in the proceedings.
The doctors-the involuntary thinkers and alleged direct infringers
of Claim 13-were not present in the courtroom. The defendant was
Laboratory Corporation of America ("LabCorp"), a company that
provides blood analyses, including homocysteine tests, for medical
doctors. The exclusive licensee of the '658 patent, Metabolite
Laboratories ("Metabolite"), sued LabCorp on a theory of secondary
liability, alleging that LabCorp was monetarily responsible for the
doctors' direct infringements because its homocysteine-test services
aided and abetted the doctors' infringing conduct. The district court
held LabCorp liable for both contributory liability and active
inducement, two different theories of secondary liability, but the
Federal Circuit affirmed only on the basis of active inducement. 174
In calculating damages, the district court and the Federal Circuit
both concluded that all doctors who ordered the homocysteine test from
LabCorp directly infringed Claim 13.175 This conclusion on damages
involves distinct factual and legal components.
Factually, the district court found that all doctors who ordered
homocysteine tests performed the mental act of correlating required to
diagnose a vitamin B12 deficiency. In other words, all doctors who
performed the homocysteine test appropriated the patentee's
entitlement. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding support in the record
for this factual conclusion in the idea that "it would be malpractice for
a doctor to receive a total homocysteine test without determining [a
vitamin B12] deficiency." 176 The factual finding that all doctors who
174. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
175. The court calculated LabCorp's damages based on all homocysteine tests
that LabCorp performed. Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1364. Because nobody is ever
secondarily liable in the absence of direct infringement, see Standard Haven Prods. v.
Gencor Indus., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]here can be no inducement
of infringement or contributory infringement . . . in the absence of direct
infringement."), the court necessarily concluded that all doctors who ordered
LabCorp's homocysteine tests were direct infringers.
176. Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1364.
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ordered homocysteine tests performed the vitamin B12 correlation is
open to question, but it is within the realm of possibility. Knowledge of
the statistical generalization was widespread in the medical community
as it was published in the New England Journal of Medicine,'77 and the
mental act of correlating is a reflexive act.
Legally, the conclusion that all doctors who ordered homocysteine
tests were infringers is more troubling. The district court did not leave
any space between the legal concept of infringement and the factual
concept of appropriation of a claimed entitlement. It equated strict
liability with absolute liability and assumed that all doctors who
appropriated the patentee's entitlement were direct infringers.' It
failed to flag the constructive-nonvolition problem that the reflexive act
of correlating recited in Claim 13 is likely to entail. Both before and
after the discovery of the statistical generalization linking vitamin B12
and homocysteine that underlies Claim 13, doctors could order
homocysteine tests and put them to several different uses.'79 Laboratory
Corp. therefore may involve some doctors who perform the method of
Claim 13 in a constructively nonvolitional manner. In order to avoid or
reduce the benefit obtained from the patented, vitamin-B 12-related act
of thinking, some doctors may have to abandon a valued privilege that
they enjoy in PW1, namely the performance of the homocysteine test
for some other purpose.' ° The task of identifying the subset of the
appropriating doctors who acted in a constructively nonvolitional
fashion is taken up in the following Section.' 8
177. Brief for Respondents at 4, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607).
178. The existence of a constructive-nonvolition exception to patent
infringement presents a legal question. Whether a particular doctor appropriated the
entitlement in a constructively nonvolitional fashion presents an issue of fact.
179. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
180. If the laboratories that perform homocysteine tests and that are potentially
secondarily liable pay licenses under the '658 patent, no doctors will ever be required
to avoid performing a homocysteine test to avoid infringement. The uniform payment
of royalties on all homocysteine tests, however, leads to the unacceptable result that the
constructively nonvolitional appropriators of the claimed method pay a royalty in order
to practice the PW1 art. Constructive nonvolition should lead to a verdict of
noninfringement, not merely to an award of monetary rather than injunctive relief.
181. The district court's opinion is complicated by the relationship between its
holding on damages (all doctors who ordered the homocysteine test infringed Claim 13)
and its holding on contributory infringement that was not reviewed by the Federal
Circuit. The jury verdict holding LabCorp liable for contributory infringement
necessarily entails a finding that there were no substantially noninfringing uses for the
homocysteine test after the issuance of the '658 patent. See supra note 160. One
interpretation of this finding is that, as a matter of fact, doctors had no substantial use
for homocysteine tests other than diagnosing vitamin B12 deficiencies. This first
interpretation leads to the "simplifying assumption" discussed in inta Part IV.D.2.a.
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In the lower courts, Laboratory Corp. looked like a run-of-the-mill
patent case that centered on questions of claim construction,
infringement, and damages. When the Supreme Court accepted
certiorari, however, it actively refrained Laboratory Corp. and turned it
into a case about patentable subject matter under section 101. Neither
the proceedings below nor the petitioner's question on certiorari
expressly mentioned section 101, but the Court requested a brief from
the Solicitor General on the following question: "Is [Claim 13] invalid
because one cannot patent 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas'?" '182 The Solicitor General opined that the Court should
deny certiorari because the record below was insufficiently developed
and the case was not "an appropriate vehicle for resolving the Court's
question., 11 3 The Court ignored this advice and granted the writ. 
s4
After the parties and numerous amicus addressed the "law of nature" or
"natural phenomenon" question, however, the Court's fervor to address
the section 101 question subsided. Two and a half months after oral
argument, the Court reversed course and dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted.18 5 Justice Stephen Breyer dissented from the
dismissal of the writ, arguing that the Court should have held that
Claim 13 recites unpatentable subject matter. 86
Some issues in Laboratory Corp. must have been intuitively
troublesome to the Court (or it would not have reached out to grant
certiorari against the advice of the Solicitor General), yet the Court
never gained any analytical traction on framing or resolving those
Here, there are no substantial noninfringing uses because all doctors who ordered the
test wanted to diagnose vitamin B12 deficiencies. No doctors wanted to do anything
else with the homocysteine test. Another interpretation of the jury's implicit finding of
a lack of a substantial noninfringing use, however, is that the doctors valued the
homocysteine tests for uses other than the diagnosis of a vitamin B12 deficiency, but
that the doctors were unable to engage in those non-vitamin-B12-related uses without
also engaging in the vitamin-B12-related use and infringing Claim 13 (if strict liability
is equated with absolute liability). This second assumption leads to the "complicated
reality" discussed in Jmffa Part IV.D.2.b. This Article considers the second assumption
to be reality because of the evidence in the record suggesting that doctors ordered
homocysteine tests to assess patients' cardiovascular health.
182. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 543 U.S. 1185,
1185 (2005) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
183. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2005) (No. 04-607).
184. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 999
(2005).
185. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921
(2006).
186. Id. at 2921-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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issues (or it would not have dismissed the case).187 One theory to
explain the Court's oscillation between passive and aggressive
approaches is that constructive nonvolition was the troublesome yet
unidentified issue.'88 Breyer was in part bothered by the notion that
"any competent doctor reviewing [the homocysteine] test results . . .
automatically correlate[s] those results with the presence or absence of
a vitamin deficiency.' ' 189 At the very end of the proceedings, the
problem of constructive nonvolition that is magnified in claims to
reflexive acts of thinking could at last be seen lurking just below the
surface. '90
2. TWO-STEP ANALYSIS
The lower courts' error in Laboratory Corp. is most clearly
presented through a two-step analysis. The first step presumes that
homocysteine tests are valuable only for diagnosing vitamin B12
deficiencies and rare genetic disorders. 9' Under this simplifying
assumption, the courts may have come to the proper outcome despite
the fact that constructive nonvolition was never expressly raised. The
second step adds into the mix the doctors who use homocysteine tests to
assess a patient's vascular health. 92 Many of these doctors are
constructively nonvolitional appropriators, and the courts erroneously
concluded that they were direct infringers. This second step also
illustrates the factual difficulty of identifying constructively
nonvolitional appropriators.
a. Simplifying Assumption
If homocysteine tests are presumed to be valuable only for
diagnosing rare genetic disorders and vitamin B12 deficiencies, the
187. The retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor after the court accepted
certiorari may also have influenced the Court's reversal.
188. The propertization of thought in general may also have been part of the
troublesome issue. Not only did Breyer list "mental processes" as a category of
unpatentable subject matter, id. at 2923 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)), but he also noted that Metabolite "cannot avoid the
fact that the [claimed] process is no more than an instruction to read some numbers in
light of medical knowledge." Id. at 2928.
189. Id. at 2925 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2924.
190. At least one amicus brief presented the problem generated by the reflexive
nature of the claimed act of "correlating" to the Court. Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP,
at 2, 9, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2005)
(No. 04-607).
191. Cf supra note 104 and accompanying text.
192. Cf supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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outcome in Laboratory Corp. was at least arguably the correct one. In
terms of the XYZ model discussed above, the homocysteine test, good
X, is a polyvalent data-gathering step. It can be used in conjunction
with the patentee's inventive good Y, the vitamin B12 correlation. It
can also be used in conjunction with good Z, the genetic-disease
correlation that the patentee did not invent and that is represented in
PW1 (and the prior art). If the courts had held strictly liable any doctor
who valued the homocysteine test only in conjunction with the genetic-
disease correlation, Claim 13 would have been both economically and
constitutionally overbroad. 93 To redress the overbreadth issue, the
courts must exempt from liability all doctors who order the
homocysteine test as a means of diagnosing rare genetic disorders and
yet reflexively perform the correlating step of Claim 13. These doctors
are constructively nonvolitional appropriators. They merely desire to
practice a valued PW1 privilege, and they cannot reduce the benefit that
they receive from the patented act of thinking about the vitamin B12
correlation without abandoning that privilege.
Whether any of these doctors who sought to diagnose genetic
diseases were actually held strictly liable as a factual matter, however,
is difficult to determine. The district court concluded that all doctors
who ordered homocysteine tests from LabCorp were direct infringers of
Claim 13,194 and it is factually possible that the genetic disease is
sufficiently rare that no doctors who ordered homocysteine tests from
LabCorp intended to diagnose it. Even if a handful of doctors did order
the homocysteine test to diagnose the genetic disease, the overbreadth is
slight.
Interestingly, Metabolite itself took a position before the Federal
Circuit that supported a constructive-nonvolition exemption for the
doctors who sought to diagnose the genetic disease. Metabolite argued
that doctors who ordered homocysteine tests to diagnose the genetic
defect were not infringers.'95 Realizing the difficulty of defending the
193. See generally supra Part IV.B (economic overbreadth) and Part IV.C
(constitutional overbreadth).
194. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
195. Metabolite made this argument in the part of its brief before the Federal
Circuit that sought to uphold the district court's ruling that LabCorp was contributorily
liable for the doctors' direct infringements. Brief for Appellees at 43 & n. 12,
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (No. 03-1120). Only parties who sell nonstaple goods that cannot be put to a
substantial noninfringing use can be held contributorily liable. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(2000). Metabolite conceded that the use of a homocysteine test to diagnose the rare
genetic condition was a noninfringing use but argued that it was an insubstantial one.
The Federal Circuit did not comment on this argument because it affirmed LabCorp's
secondary liability only on the basis of active inducement and not on the basis of
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overbreadth that would otherwise result, the patentee became an
advocate of constructive nonvolition as an exemption to infringement
(although it certainly did not use this language). It acknowledged that
the courts had to separate out the hypothetical demand curves for X+Y
and X+Z and that the owner of the entitlement to the irrevocable
bundle merited a supracompetitive profit based only on the latter under
the reward principle.' 96
b. Complicated Reality
Metabolite made no such constructive-nonvolition concession with
respect to the doctors who ordered homocysteine tests in order to assess
a patient's vascular health. There was evidence in the record indicating
that a significant number of doctors ordered homocysteine tests from
LabCorp for the purpose of assessing vascular health. 197 Yet both the
district court and the Federal Circuit treated all doctors who ordered
homocysteine tests as direct infringers. Unlike the question that remains
open with respect to tests for the genetic disease, there is no question
that, as a matter of fact, some doctors did order the homocysteine test
to diagnose their patients' vascular health.
The economic and constitutional overbreadth that results from
holding all doctors who assess cardiovascular health liable as infringers
of Claim 13 is again evident from the XYZ model of irrevocable
bundles. The homocysteine test is still good X, and the inventive
vitamin B12 correlation remains good Y. To accommodate another use
for the homocysteine test, the genetic-disorder use becomes good Z1
and the vascular-health use becomes good Z2. Good Z2 (the vascular-
disease-homocysteine correlation) was known in some form prior to the
invention of good Y (the vitamin B 12-homocysteine correlation),' 98 so
the use of X+Z2 is both a prior art and a PW1 privilege. To avoid both
contributory liability. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
196. It is possible, but unlikely, that Metabolite was arguing that the doctors
who desired to diagnose rare genetic diseases did not infringe because they did not
know about the vitamin B12 correlation.
197. See supra note 105.
198. The correlation between homocysteine and vascular health was initially
proposed as far back as 1969. Brief for Appellees at 12, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120). It did not gain
widespread acceptance as a diagnostic tool in the medical community, however, until
after the issuance of the '658 patent. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2923 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see infra note 204 and
accompanying text (considering the possibility that the contemporary act of correlating
homocysteine and cardiovascular health is categorically different from the act of
correlating that could be performed in 1969).
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constitutional and economic overbreadth, a doctor should not be
required to give up the privilege of using the XZ2 bundle merely to
reduce the benefit obtained from the patented good XY. A doctor who
desires the homocysteine test only as a tool to assess vascular disease is
a constructively nonvolitional appropriator.
Metabolite argued that the genetic-disease and vascular-health
correlations were different in a way that makes a difference. According
to Metabolite, doctors who ordered homocysteine tests for the purpose
of assessing a patient's vascular health were direct infringers because
the method of assessing vascular disease and the claimed method of
diagnosing vitamin B12 deficiencies are in fact one and the same
method. In a sense, Metabolite is correct. The parties' briefs suggest
that the vitamin B12 and vascular-health correlations are transitive:
vitamin B12 deficiencies correlate to elevated homocysteine levels
which in turn correlate to problems for a patient's vascular health. As
Metabolite described the situation, a diagnosis of a vitamin B12
deficiency identifies a cause of the elevated homocysteine level and an
assessment of vascular health identifies an effect. 199 The
interdependence of these two correlations, however, cannot justify
holding a doctor who seeks to assess a patient's cardiovascular health
liable for infringement of Claim 13. If anything, it highlights in even
greater contrast the need for a constructive-nonvolition exemption from
infringement. The ability to correlate an elevated homocysteine level to
vascular disease was in the prior art of the '658 patent. s° In order to
reduce the benefit obtained from performing the method recited in
Claim 13, the doctor must abandon this privilege that he or she
possesses and values in PW1. 2°' By discovering a new cause of a
previously known effect of elevated homocysteine, Metabolite seeks a
right to exclude that is broad enough to prevent the free use of the
homocysteine test to detect the previously known effect.20 2
199. Brief for Appellees at 45, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120).
200. The presence of the vascular-health correlation in the prior art does not
mean that Claim 13 should have been invalid for lack of novelty. The interdependence
of the correlations became known only after the invention was disclosed in the '658
patent.
201. But see infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing a doctor's ability
to reduce the benefit obtained from the patent entitlement by altering post-thinking
conduct).
202. Metabolite characterized the post-'658 invention situation as the
"discovery of a new manifestation (vascular disease) of an old problem (BI2 . . .
deficiency)," Brief for Appellees at 45, Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1120), but Metabolite's own
characterization of the record suggests that it is the '658 invention itself that is more
821
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Laboratory Corp. illustrates how courts can err if they equate strict
liability with absolute liability. Doctors who use a homocysteine test
only to assess a patient's vascular health reflexively appropriate the
entitlement described by Claim 13, but the constructive-nonvolition
exemption should apply. Otherwise, the patentee's reward violates the
reward principle, and the reduction in the public's rights violates the
baseline principle.0 3
Laboratory Corp. also allows the patent community to take stock
of exactly how difficult it can be to distinguish infringers of reflexive-
thought-propertizing claims from constructively nonvolitional
appropriators. The distinction entails at least three questions.
First, courts must identify a prior art comprised of acts of thinking
and determine whether an allegedly infringing act of thinking that
occurs today is part of the prior art.2' The comparison of contemporary
technology to the prior art is a commonplace patent law procedure, but
it is more difficult when acts of thinking are the technology at issue.
Acts of thinking do not leave the same externalized trail to document
their existence. Is the vascular-health correlation employed today the
same as the vascular-health correlation that was known in 1969, or is it
different in some way that is significant? The relatively poor
documentation of acts of thinking and society's inability to specify their
precise contents makes this question a difficult one. Contemporary
doctors may well understand the correlation between homocysteine and
vascular health in much greater detail than their 1969 counterparts did.
For example, using a factually fabricated example, they may know
accurately described as the discovery of a new cause (B12 deficiency) for an old
problem (vascular disease) of elevated homocysteine.
203. If doctors who appropriate the Claim 13 entitlement to assess
cardiovascular health are not direct infringers, then the district court also erred in
making LabCorp contributorily liable. The homocysteine test has a substantial
noninfringing use. See supra note 160 (explaining that only sellers of nonstaple goods
without substantial noninfringing uses can be contributory infringers). However, the
Federal Circuit may not have erred when it affirmed the district court's conclusion that
LabCorp was secondarily liable on the basis of active inducement. See Metabolite
Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
(However, the damages award should not have included the homocysteine tests ordered
by the constructively nonvolitional appropriators.) If LabCorp's promotional material
emphasized the diagnosis of a vitamin B12 deficiency rather than the assessment of
vascular health, then it may have aided and abetted the infringing doctors. Because the
vitamin B12 and vascular-health correlations are so closely intertwined, however,
making a clean distinction between promotional materials that promote one rather than
the other would be a difficult task.
204. Examiners and judges also face a similar problem when determining the
novelty and nonobviousness of a thought-propertizing claim. They must determine
whether the claimed act of thinking is in the prior art or is obvious in light of the prior
art.
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more precisely today that an elevated homocysteine level indicates a
seventy percent chance of poor vascular health. Do these refinements in
the vascular-health correlation mean that the correlation is different
from and nonobvious in light of the correlation that exists in the prior
art?
Second, assuming that the allegedly infringing contemporary act of
thinking is not represented in the prior art, a court must determine
whether it nonetheless exists in PW1. Here, a court must engage a
complex counterfactual hypothetical: What do we know in PW1-the
possible world that is closest to the actual world yet in which the
vitamin B12 correlation is never discovered? In PW1, do we eventually
come to know the more precise refinement of the vascular-health
correlation that exists in the actual world today?2 5 If the answer is yes,
then a doctor who uses a homocysteine test to diagnose a patient's
vascular health is a constructively nonvolitional appropriator of Claim
13 even if the contemporary vascular-health correlation is not in the
prior art.
Third, assuming that the contemporary vascular-health correlation
is represented in PW1, a court must determine whether a doctor who
reflexively performs the act of correlating recited in Claim 13 could
have reduced the benefit obtained from the patented technology without
abandoning a valued PW1 privilege. This question in turn needs to be
divided into two sub questions that address roughly the defendant's
state of mind before the claimed act of thinking and the defendant's
conduct after it. First, does the doctor value the PW1 privilege of
diagnosing vascular disease at the time he or she orders the
homocysteine test? This is a question of ex ante intent in the sense of
motivation for willingness to pay. If a doctor, such as a vitamin
specialist, is indifferent to a patient's vascular health when he or she
orders the homocysteine test, the doctor an infringer.2 °6 Second, even if
a doctor valued a PW1 privilege and desired to obtain information
about a patient's vascular health at the time the homocysteine test was
ordered, the doctor's conduct after the test can transform the
constructively nonvolitional doctor into an infringer. If a defendant
takes affirmative steps to benefit from the patent entitlement that are not
necessary to enjoy PW1 privileges that he or she valued, the defendant
is an infringer. If a doctor orders a homocysteine test with the sole
purpose of assessing a patient's vascular health but then delivers a
205. Cf supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
identifying the full contents of PWI with certainty).
206. If a doctor has mixed motives, then the constructive-nonvolition analysis
may differ depending upon whether economic or constitutional overbreadth is at issue.
See supra notes 165, 170.
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diagnosis of a vitamin B12 deficiency to a patient after viewing the test
results, the doctor infringes Claim 13.207 By remaining silent, the doctor
can reduce the benefit obtained from the patented act of correlating
without facing any cost other than the legitimate opportunity cost of
practicing the PW1 art in the actual world.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article makes the same argument on two nested levels of
generality. At the more general level, it argues that courts should not
equate strict liability with absolute liability in patent cases and that
constructive nonvolition should provide an exemption to patent
infringement. It pulls together the previously unconnected cases of
Smitline Beecham v. Apotex and Monsanto v. Schmeiser as well as
a number of hypotheticals to explain and illustrate the concept.
Constructive nonvolition identifies an unusual type of violation of the
reward and baseline principles that is not visible on the radar screens of
courts using only the traditional invalidity doctrines to search for
overbroad claims. It focuses on the unjustifiable restriction of a
defendant's options and argues that the absence of sufficient liberty or
choice in those options can justify a defendant's appropriation of an
otherwise valid patent entitlement.
At the more specific level, this Article brings constructive
nonvolition to bear on a class of claims that raise the constructive-
nonvolition issue on a scale previously unknown in patent law: claims
that propertize reflexive thought. It initially picks the easy fight. Claims
to freestanding, reflexive acts of thinking create entitlements to others'
involuntary conduct, and the need for a constructive-nonvolition
exemption to infringement in cases involving these claims is self-
evident. It then examines claims that describe entitlements to the
performance of a deliberate data-gathering step that has been
irrevocably bundled with an inventive, reflexive act of thinking. It
argues that claims to irrevocable bundles, too, will frequently grant
patentees rights that are overbroad unless courts recognize a
constructive-nonvolition exemption from infringement. It illustrates that
the overbreadth that results from imposing per se liability has both
economic and constitutional dimensions, and it identifies the
207. Similarly, if a doctor orders a homocysteine test with the intent of
assessing a patient's vascular health but then medicates a patient with vitamin B12, the
doctor is an infringer unless the treatment of poor vascular health with vitamin B12 is a
practice that exists in PW1 even though the correlation between homocysteine and
vitamin B12 is not known.
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overbreadth that resulted because the lower courts in Laboratory Corp.
failed to address the problem of constructive nonvolition.
At both levels of generality, the body of this Article focuses on
debunking the reflexive equation of strict liability and absolute liability
and identifying the circumstances under which constructively
nonvolitional appropriation of a patent entitlement occurs. In
conclusion, it looks down the road and, assuming that the courts
recognize a constructive nonvolition exemption, considers two possible
implications of that recognition for thought-propertizing claims.
The first implication follows from the high cost of the
constructive-nonvolition analysis. As the analysis of the doctors who
performed the vascular health correlation in Laboratory Corp. suggests,
the identification of constructively nonvolitional infringers may be a
detailed, intricate, and difficult analysis. 28 The Federal Circuit and the
PTO should therefore consider implementing a per se bar on any
method claim that can be routinely appropriated by the performance of
an involuntary act. Case-by-case examination of a nonfrivolous,
constructive-nonvolition defense may be required in any patent
infringement suit because any patent entitlement may be appropriated in
a constructively nonvolitional manner under exceptional circumstances.
However, if the final and inventive step of a method describes a type of
conduct that is routinely performed in an involuntary fashion, the
likelihood of a court having to address a constructive-nonvolition
defense increases by several orders of magnitude. To reduce the high
cost of a case-by-case examination of constructive nonvolition, it may
make sense to cut the problem off at the pass and invalidate a distinct
group of claims if they entail an unusually high probability of
nonfrivolous, constructive nonvolition defenses.
The second implication looks at how patent applicants will respond
to judicial recognition of constructive nonvolition and highlights the
relatively minor effect that even the per se bar considered above would
have on the scope of patent protection. The resolution of the problem of
constructive nonvolition should not be confused with a resolution of the
problem posed by the propertization of thought more broadly. Some
thought-propertizing claims are more purposive than reflexive,209 and
they are largely unaffected by the exemption for constructively
nonvolitional appropriation of a patent entitlement. Furthermore, many
thought-propertizing claims that do recite reflexive acts of thinking may
be readily altered with only a small reduction in scope to prevent
routine appropriation by involuntary acts. For example, thought-
208. See supra Part IV.D.2.b.
209. See supra Part III.B.
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propertizing claims could be transformed into speech-propertizing
claims. The inventors of the '658 patent could add a third and final step
to Claim 13 such as "informing the patient of a vitamin B12
deficiency."2 '0 The inclusion of a token, post-thought deliberate act of
expression means that a defendant's involuntary performance of the
reflexive act of thinking does not appropriate the claimed entitlement.21
Thus, even if the problem of constructive nonvolition is recognized and
solved-through either the implementation of a constructive-nonvolition
exemption to infringement or the invalidation of thought-propertizing
claims that are likely to be performed involuntarily on a regular basis-
a patentee may still internalize the benefit that the public receives from
thinking about the inventive information disclosed in the patent
specification. For better or worse, redress of the overbreadth caused by
the reflexive nature of some acts of thinking need not be anything other
than a speed bump on the road to the widespread propertization of
thought.
210. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the role of post-
thinking conduct in the identification of constructive nonvolition).
211. The inclusion of any post-thinking, deliberate step is insufficient. The step
must be limited to expressing or acting on the conclusion reached through the act of
thinking. If a third step such as "walking out of the office" were added to the
Laboratory Corp. claim, it would not eliminate the constructive-nonvolition problem.
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